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PREFACE
This briefing book on the unitary method of apportionment has been prepared for use by Committee members and
other interested parties in connection with the hearing of
the Assembly Committee on Revenue and Taxation in Sacramento
on December 16, 1981.
The objectives of the book are two-fold:
1)

to provide a brief background on the subject, particularly for new Committee members and others who
have not attended Committee hearings on this subject
in the past, and

2)

to review 1981 developments as they relate to this
issue.

For further background information, the reader is referred
to earlier reports of this Committee:

California's

Bank &

Corporation Tax, Vol. II: Unitary Method of Apportionment, 496 pp.,
Nov. 1979 (Purlication #750); Unitary Method of Apportionment:
A Second Look, 71 pp., Nov. 1980 (Publication #810).

They may

be purchased by contacting the Assembly Publications Office,
P.O. Box 90, State Capitol, Sacramento 95814.
i

This briefing book was prepared by David Doerr, Chief
Consultant to the Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee.
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UNITARY METHOD OF APPORTIONMENT:

NEW DEVELOPMENTS

POLICY ISSUES
ISSUE
California uses the unitary method of apportionment,
with world-wide combination, to determine that portion of
the income of multistate and multinational corporations
which is subject to tax by California. Should California'.s
application of the unitary method of apportionment be
revised?

If so, to what extent?

QUESTIONS
1.

Is world-wide combination, as part of the unitary

method of allocating income, the best way to determine the·
amount of income of multinational

corporations which is

subject to taxation by California?
2.

What are the alternatives to world-wide combination?

What are the advantages and disadvantages of these alternatives?
3.

Are there unique differences between foreign-based

corporations (and subsidiaries thereof) and domestic corporations?

Should there be a difference in the formula for '

foreign-based corporations?

If so,

distinctions by industry groups?

should there be further

For example, should foreign-

based energy companies, steel c6mpanie·s, and owners of
aqricultural lands (or their subsidiaries) continue to
be subject to world-wide combination in the same manner as
their domestic counterparts?
4.

What are the fiscal ramifications of the various

alternatives?

If there is a revenue shortfall, to whom should

the tax burden be shifted?
1

5.

What are the potential economic effects of main-

taining current law and of the various alternatives to
current law?

2

B!I.CKGROUND

The term "unitary method of apportionment"
referred to as "unitary

tax~

(sometimes

which is a misnomer) refers

to the method used by California to determine state taxable
income of multistate and multinational corporations which do
business in California.

The term "unitary" is used to

indicate that the entire operations of such a corporation
are treated as a single unit and the income is allocated
or apportioned by formula, rather than accounted for separately
by operation or location.
The unitary method of apportioning income to California
for purposes of the Bank and Corporation tax has generated
substantial controversy in recent years.

The application

of the unitary method to the "world-wide" income of multinational corporations has been the most significant area of
disagreement between state tax officials and the business
community.

World-wide combination is the inclusion in the

computation of the California tax return "world-wide" information from the corporations comprisinq the unitary business
with respect to profits, property, payroll and sales.
California taxes its share of world-wide profits depending on
its percentage of world-wide property, payroll and sales.
Present Law
The California franchise or income tax applies only to
that portion of a corporation's total net income that is
"derived from or attributable to sources within this state 11
All corporations, whether created or organized in a
foreign country or in the United States, are now treated
3

•

similarly under unitary apportionment principles applied by
California.
Where a corporation or group of related corporations
operates both within and outside of California, the Franchise
Tax Board first determines which corporate or intercorporate
activities are sufficiently related to be included in the
corporate taxpayer's unitary business income base.

The

"business income" of such unitary operations is then apportioned by formula, by determining the total "world-wide" income
of the unitary business and then apportioning a share to
California based on a three-factor apportionment formula.
Case law has cited Section 2510

of the Revenue and

Taxation Code as the controlling statute in this area:
"When the income of a taxpayer subject to the tax
imposed under this part is derived from or attributed
to sources both within and without the state, the tax
shall be measured by the net income derived from or
attributed to sources within this state in accordance
with the provisions of Article 2 ... "
Article 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, the Uniform
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA), provides
guidelines to be used by the Franchise Tax Board (FTB) in
allocating income by formula.
Appendix I,

(For text of UDITPA, see

yellow pages).

Section 25137 permits variation from the standard
allocation and apportionment provisions when they do not
fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's business activity
in this state.

4

How the Unitary Concept is Applied
When the FTB determines that the business c~nducted both
wi thi.n and without California is unitary, the portion of the
business income from that unitary business which is "derived
from or att;tj:butable to sources within this state'' is
determined by formula apportionment.

This approach is

followed where the unitary business is conducted by a single
corporation or by separate corporations under common ownership or control.
In determining whether a single corporation with operations
within and without California is engaged in a unitary business,
or whether a group of separate corporations within and without
California is required to determine its

income by use of a

"combined report", the geographic locations of the corporate
business activities are immaterial.

Foreign sources as well

as domestic sources of income are all taken into account.
Then an apportionment formula is applied to determine the
amount of income derived from California sources.
The FTB uses an arithmetic average of three factors to
allocate unitary business income in California. The three
factors are property, payroll and sales.
California property, payroll and sales as a percent of
world-wide property, payroll and sales is computed.

The

average of the three ratios is then applied to "world-wide"
income to determine the share of income of the unitary business which is apportioned to California.

It is to this

income figure that the California corporation tax rate is
applied.
5

Although this formula will result in distortions in ;na.ny
cases, the courts have repeatedly ruled that the formula
need not be precise and that a rough approximation is
sufficient.
For some businesses, there are special formulas and exceptions to the general apportionment formula.
The following example of a mythical corporation shows
the application of the three-factor formula:
EXAMPLE -- MYTHICAL CORPORATION
In
california
Sales
Property
Payroll

$1,000,000
4,000,000
2,000,000

% Calif.
to world

Total - all
over the world

5%
10%
20%

$20,000,000
40,000,000
10,000,000

Average

11.6666%

Total world-wide income of corp.

$5,000,000

Income allocable to California:
World-wide income of corp.
Unitary apportionment factor

$5,000,000
X
ll. 6666%
$

583,300

$

583,300
9.6%
55,997

California Tax:
California Income
Bank & Corp tax rate
TAX

X

$

Non-Business. Income
Income derived from unitary business operations is
apportioned by formula.

Other "nonbusiness'' income, i.e.,

income attributable to intangible assets or to other property
not related to the principal or unitary business (including

6

dividends, interest, rents and royalties) is allocated
entirely to the taxpayer's commercial domicile, i.e., the
"headquarters" office.

(This issue is now on appeal with

the State Board of Equalization.)
Interest expense also affects the taxability of dividend
In general, under Section 24344(b)

and interest income.

interest expense is allowed as a deduction against business

•

interest income subject to apportionment.

Additional interest

expense is deductible against nonbusiness interest and dividend
income by the amount of their interest expense.

Corporations

which are not commercially domiciled in this state must reduce
their interest expense by an amount equivalent to their nonbusiness interest and
reportable if their

dividen~

co~~ercial

income which would have been
domicile had been

this

state.
Rationale For Unitary Apportionment
The unitary method was developed early in the history of
state taxation of corporate income.

Originally it applied

mainly to corporations with operations in several states
of the U.S.

It was believed that such corporations could

manipulate their internal accounts in such a way as to shift
profits earned in California or another high tax state to
a state with low or no taxes on corporate income.

As

multinational corporations became more common, the same
principle was applied to them.

7

This method assumes that the income of certain corporaions with multiple operations or facilities cannot be
ccurate

assigned to a specific

For

tion.

income of a firm which manufactures
ts into

one state, assembles the

c

ished

a

ct

in a second state, and markets the

on a nationwide or regional basis is treated on a unita
basis.

s concept the total income is treated as

a s

unit and no attempt is made to

ne

cal

what portions of the income were der

ifi-

from com-

manufacturing or assembly.
The Alternative To The Unitarv Tax
The

alternative to the present "world-wide
" suggested by its opponents is to rely upon
accounting" method.

the "

This

would allow

a operations of a multistate or mult
as a un

to continue to be trea

U.S. but such firms would be

i

of

ary business
to
s of

transactions with overseas
rm at

tional

ces reflecting fair market value.

ir
its

firms would be conducted to ensure that such intertransactions were conducted "at arms 1
to

taxes on Cali

a

ment currently uses this system
income tax.
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f

s.

not

The federal govern-

purposes of

1

Arguments In Favor Of The Unltary

~ethod

Of Apportionment

Supporters of the unitary method argue that, while the
concept may be somewhat arbitrary, and the three-factor formula
may produce some distortions in profits taxed by California,
in general the system works fairly to tax the complex and
interconnected operations of rnultistate and multinational
corporation.

The alternative to the unitary system--the

separate accounting method--would require the taxpaying
corporation to provide a set of records reflecting the
"arms length" transactions among subsidiaries.

Since the

California subsidiary is part of a multinational or multistate corporation, an assumption of "arms lenath" transactionR
with other parts of the parent firm may be at least as arbitrary
as the assumption underlying the unitary method.

In addition,

supporters argue that while audits of the unitary apportionment rely on such things as payrolls, sales and property
values which can be measured in the market place,the use
of "arms length" pricing relies upon values for transactions
where there may be no corresponding free market.

Such audits,

they argue, may be more onerous than current unitary method
audits.
They further argue that separate accounting is not
working well at the federal level and would be impossible
for a state to enforce without an army of auditors.
Finally, supporters of the unitary method argue that
total repeal of the unitary methodology may result in a
large revenue loss to California.

9

Arguments Against the Unitary Method of Apportionment
Opponents of the unitary method of apportionment argue
that:
--The

factor formula is based on

quest

assumption that property, sales and payrolls
pro

ts

le
equal

all parts of the world. This.may not be true,

particularly for investments in foreign
markedly from the U.S.

es that differ

If profits are relat

California, the unitary system exports pro

higher in
ts and produces

a lower California tax. If profits are re
in California, the unitary system

lower

ts California with

profits earned elsewhere and subjects them to Cali

a tax.

--Calculation of the payroll,sales, and property factors
s statements

the need to prepare consolidated earn

impose unreasonable record-keeping burdens on foreign cornorations.
tary system may discourage investment in new
plants

California because any investment

payrolls, sales or property will,

the uni

cause some part of U.S. or \vorldwide
Cali

California

ts to

even though the California

suffer a loss. ( However, the uni

stern,

s

the firm

stem

investments in California in circumstances where
relat

profits earned

rel
investment.

California are larger than the

, payroll and sa

s

In these situat

s,

reduce California tax liability.)

California created by
s

s will

--The Ca]jfornia method may lead to intcrnatjonal doubletaxation of profits and frustrate efforts to coordinate
national taxing systems.

This issue arose during considera-

tion of the U.S.- United Kingdom tax treaty which would
have banned California's unitary system. Several multinational
firms have expressed the desire for California to abolish
its unitary tax because some less developed "Third World"
countries may seek to copy this system.
--The major objections appear to be to the use of
"world-wide" combination and the inclusion of foreign income
and factors in the computation, rather than to the "unitary
method of apportionment" in total.
--Foreign domiciled businesses cite additonal special
problems, such as:
•in many foreign countries, historical cost data
are not kept, making accurate computations of the.
property factor difficult
•accounting procedures are often not uniform
•there are problems in foreign exchange rates
•some countries have imposed currency controls
•in some cases, information requested by the FTB
violates foreign laws regarding confidentiality,
sometimes involving defense secrets of another
country
•the apportionment factors do not adjust for
cultural differences in employment in foreign
countries, which affect calculations of value.
Fiscal Implications
According to the Franchise Tax Board, approximately
72% of the net income reported for bank and corporation tax

11

purposes is attributable to apportioning corporations dnd
approximately 50% of net income is attributable to multinational corporations, for the 1975

come year.

Applying these percentages to the estimated 1979-80
bank and corporation tax, the amount of tax estimated to
be paid by corporations (approximate figures) would be as
follows:
Multinational corps ---$1,283,000,000
Multistate corps -----564,500,000
California-only corps-718,500,000
$2,566,000,000
It is difficult to estimate the impact of any potential
change intheunitary approach on state revenue.

In order

to develop an accurate estimate, the current tax liability
for each multinational corporation would have to be computed
both by using audited world-wide unitary figures and then
by using audited USA-only unitary and overseas separate
accounting figures.

Then a further study

ld be made to

determine the offsetting effect in revenues of the economic
impact of the bill.

Obviously, these studies would require

a very major investment of time and money.
The most recent estimates available are those developed by
the Franchise Tax Board in connection
1981.

th bills introduced

Refer to Appendix II, buff pages.
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Recent Legislative History
Although proposals to modify California's unitary method
of apportionment were introduced in the Legislature as early
as 1978 (AB 2363, Hughes; AB 3415, Fazio), intensive legislative review of the issue did not occur until late in 1979.
The Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee held an interim
hearing in Los Angeles on November 13, 1979, to hear testimony
from a number of witnesses, including some which came from as

•

far away as London, England.

The primary focus at that hearing

was AB 525, by Assemblywoman Teresa Hughes, which had been
introduced in the California Assembly on February 12, 1979.
Upon reconvening in 1980, the Assembly passed AB 525.
This measure exempted foreign-domiciled corporations and their
subsidiaries from world-wide combination under the unitary
metbod of apportionment.

These companies would still have

been subject to the unitary method on income and factors
within the USA.

Energy companies, steel companies and owners

of agricultural property were excluded from the bill {that is,
would have remained subject to world-wide combination) .

In

addition, the bill had a sunset date of 1988.
The Senate passed a different version of the bill and
the two houses were unable to agree on common language.

The

major disagreement between the two houses was on the treatment
of foreign energy companies (principally Shell Oil Company) •
The Assembly did not want to include foreign energy companies
within the provisions of AB 525; the Senate wanted them included.
A Conference Committee report, which adopted the Assembly view
on this issue, was adopted by the Assembly on August 31, 1980,
but failed to secure the needed votes in the Senate.
13

As a result, a second interim hearing on the subject was
held by the Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee in San
Diego on November 7, 1980.

The central

sues of AB 525 were

reviewed by the Committee, with added emphas
company controversy.

on

energy

Representatives of the Franchise Tax

Board, the administration, and the business community were
present to testify.
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1981 DEVELOPMENTS
me

of

an issue for the

continued to be

rnia

a number of deve

slature in 1981.

ts, both

which kept this

Sacramento

There were
Washington, D.C.,

controversial.

Three bills, each with a different approach, were introduced
in the California Assembly

1981.

of AB 525

AB 765 (L. Stirling) limited the

the prior year

application

unitary

AB 55 (Hughes) was a repeat

to domestic operations of all

foreign based corporations.
sue.

view on this

1980 Senate

AB 1238 (Deddeh) limited the unitary method
operations of ___ companies.

of apportionment to domes
a more

led comparison

1981, and texts

measures as

the

all the b

1s, see

II,

(For

May 6,
f pages.)

The Assembly Committee on Revenue and Taxation took no
on these

1s

1981, making them two-year bills.

Ford Motor Company Proposal
At the As

ly Revenue

Taxation Committee hearing

on May 6, 1981, Ford Motor Company advanced an alternative
to the proposed
believed merited

tary

s, which members of the Committee
study.

Ford proposed that all corporate taxpayers be given the
option of:
"1.

Be
subjected to the existing California franchise
tax calculated on the present world-wide combined
unitary tax (WCUT) basis; or
15

2.

e
a.

b.

slature, on
( 1)

or
(2)

The company cited
"e

Those
1

e

Those multinational
that California's
source income to
second
investment
on income

u.s.
e

The double
results in
existing in
Pennsy
,
Georgia, etc.)
net income and
the state.

•

adjusting
ternative
significant

concept
(For the
see Appendix III,

text of

Motor

FTB Fiscal Stuqy
Subsequent to hearings on the unitary bills, Assemblyman Wadie P. Deddeh, Chairman of the Revenue and Taxation
Committee, requested the Franchise Tax Board to provide the
Committee with the fiscal impact, with appropriate comments,
of several alternative approaches to the unitary issue,
including the Ford suggestion.
The Franchise Tax Board furnished the following tax
rates on multinational corporations which would offset approximately $500 million of state revenue loss from AB 1238, had
it been in effect in 1979:
Measure of tax on multinational eorps

Tax rate
.14%

(1)

Net worth

(2}

State net income

( 3)

Property in Ca

(4)

Compensation in California

(5)

Sales in California

( 6)

Average of ( 3) ,

s. 00%
fornia

(4) and ( 5)

.15%
1.01%
.20%
.24%

For the text of the Franchise Tax Board response and
Chairman Deddeh's

tter, see Appendix IV (pink pages).
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Congressional Bills
Bills have been introduced in the

u.s.

Congress to

res

the use by States of the unitary method of apportion-

ment

determining a state's share of taxable corporate

income.

In 1978, the federal administration attempted to

limit the states' use of this apportionment method by provis

in the U.S.-United Kingdom Tax Treaty.

The U.S.

Senate refused adoption of this portion of the treaty.
In 1981, Congressman Conable introduced HR 1983 in the
House and Senator Mathias introduced

s.

655 in the Senate.

According to the Senator, his measure would "conform the
state rules to the Federal rules with

the very narrow areas

of (i) the time at which states tax the foreign source income
of foreign affiliates, and (ii) the quantity or portion of
foreign source dividends which are taxed.
"These results would be accomplished as follows:
"First, the proposed legislation would provide that a
state may not take into account or include in income subject
to tax the income of any foreign corporation in any year prior
to the year in which such income is included in income subject
to tax under the Internal Revenue Code.

Thus, the foreign

source income of a foreign subsidiary of a

u.s.

parent corpora-

would be taxed only if and to the extent paid back to
the U.S. as a dividend or deemed paid back by application
Subpart F.

u.s.

In the case of a foreign parent corporation of a

subsidiary, the foreign source income of the fo

parent (and any of its foreign affiliates) would never be taxed
because under the Internal Revenue Code
taxed by the Federal Government.
1

~

income is not

"Second, in the case of dividends received by a U.S.
parent corporation from a foreign subsidiary, the proposed
legislation would permit a state to tax no greater portion
of that dividend than the Federal government effectively taxes.
The excluded portion of any dividend would be determined by
multiplying the amount of the dividend by a fraction.

The

numerator of that fraction is the total amount of tax withheld at the source on all such dividends plus the total amount
of taxes which by application of section 902 and section 960 to
all such dividends, the
have paid.

u.s.

parent corporation is deemed to

The denominator of the fraction is 46 percent of

all such dividends.

For the purpose of applying this fraction,

the amount of the dividend includes the amount of any gross-up
under section 78.
Example
1.

Amount of dividend actually received .••.••. $115.50

2.

Gross-up dividend to reflect 23 percent
foreign tax rate ••..•.....•.•.•••.•••••.••• $150.00

3.

Foreign taxes paid (23% x $150) ••.•.•••••••

34.50

4.

Grossed-up dividend x 46 percent ••.••..•••.

69.00

5.

Item 3 divided by item 4 (in percent)......

50

6.

Excluded portion of dividend ($150 x 0.50). $ 75.00

"The rationale for this exclusion of a portion of a foreign
source dividend is the same as the rationale for the foreign tax
credit--the avoidance of double tax.

However, the result is not

to require the states to allow a credit for foreign taxes which
would tend to wipe out all state tax on foreign_ source dividends

19
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ts

"These are not true market transactions in the sense
that they represent nothing more than a company doing business
with itself.

They are internal bookkeeping transactions and

involve no real transfer of revenue outside the corporate
organization.
"When the various divisions are in different jurisdictions
which have different rates of taxation there is an obvious
opportunity to play a "shell-and-pea" game in order to avoid

•

taxes.

If the refining division faces higher taxes than the

crude producing division, taxes can be reduced simply by increasing the price at which crude oil is sold to the refining division.
As a result, the refining division makes little or no profits and
pays little or no taxes, while the producing division makes lots
of money where the tax rates are low.

In addition, it is not

unknown for an international oil company to set up off-shore
companies specifically for the purpose of avoiding taxes.
"Two points should be made.

First, all integrated (or

"unitary") corporations that operate across jurisdictional
boundaries are capable of such manipulation.

In terms of sheer

magnitude, however, nothing matches the capability of the major
oil companies.

Second, it is important to recognize that this

shifting of profits need not involve fraud or other illegality.
The Internal Revenue Service (as well as the tax authorities in
other nations) uses the so-called "arm's-length" method of
accounting in assessing the legitimacy of intracorporate
transfer prices.

According to this system, transfer prices

used for an item would be compared to the price that would prevail in a true market, or "arm's-length", transaction.

In the

petroleum industry, at any given time, there is never a single
21

price for crude oil, gasoline, or any other petroleum product.
There are clusters of "market" prices which reflect various
long-term contract prices and spot market prices.

The absence

of any one clear "market price" gives considerable latitude to
managers in setting intracorporate transfer prices.
"In comparison with the necessity of untangling a host of
intracorporate transactions and comparing them against an arm'slength standard, the unitary method presents no extraordinary
problems of fairness or workability.

In fact some tax scholars

have found it a theoretically superior instrument of tax policy.
But, tax theory aside, there is one overwhelming argument for
the unitary approach:

it can actual

be used to collect taxes.

It is no exaggeration. to say that the arm's-length method
completely fails to provide the states with a workable method
for taxing corporate income earned within their jurisdictions."
(For the complete text of the Cory article, see Appendix VI,
blue pages.)

u.s.

General Accounting Office Study
"Separate accounting

11

as administered by the U.S. Internal

Revenue Service, which is the proposed alternative to worldwide combination under the unitary method of apportionment, was
the subject of criticism in a report by the

u.s.

General

Accounting Office released September 30, 1981.
According to the report:
"When multinational corporations price transactions with
their subsidiaries, they often have the opportunity to take
advantage of disparate corporate tax rates by shifting income.
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Ideally, such prices are adjusted by IRS under Code Section 482
to those for similar transactions between unrelated parties-the so-called "arm's length standard".

However, IRS often has

difficulty identifying a true arm's length price on which to
base adjustments.
"In its review of current IRS examination data on 519

u.s.

multinationals, each having assets over $250 million and having
engaged in transactions with its foreign subsidiaries, GAO
found that only 3 percent (12 of 403) of IRS' total recommended
section 482 adjustments to reported income were based on a true
arm's length price.

The remaining adjustments were based on

estimated prices constructed by IRS using complex guidelines
prescribed by the Department of the Treasury--guidelines which
have caused administrative burden and uncertainty both for IRS
and taxpayers."
Included among the recommendations of the GAO is one
to the Secretary of the Treasury to

"b~gin

a study to identify

and evaluate the feasibility of ways to allocate income under
Section 482, including formula apportionment, which would lessen
the present uncertainty and administrative burden created by
the existing regulations.
The Department of Treasury and the IRS are in disagreement
with this recommendation.
(For excerpts from the GAO study, see Appendix VII, green
pages.)
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u.s. su2reme Court Cases
On November 9, 1981, the

u.s.

Supreme Court agreed to

two cases relating to the unitary method of apportionment.
The issue in the California case--Container Corp. of
America v. Franchise Tax Board, 81-523--is whether it is constitutional for the state to include income from a concern's
ign subsidiaries in calculating corporate income tax.
The justices also agreed to hear a case from Ill

is,

Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 8

349,

involving a taxing method almost identical to California's.
In a holding two terms

a dispute between Mobil

Oil Co. and the state of Vermont,
dividend income from the foreign subs

high court ruled that
s of a multi-

national corporation headquartered elsewhere can be inc
in a state's apportionment formula.
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APPENDIX I
Text, Uniform Division of Income
for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA)
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(b)
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25129. Property factor--defined. The property factor is a fraction,
the numerator of which is the average v:due of the taxpayer's real and
tangible personal property owned or
used in this state dming
the income year ar-.d the denominator of
is the average value of
all the taxpayer's real and tcmgible pcrson?J property owned or rented and
used during the income year.
25130. Property valuation. Property owned by the taxpayer is v:<Jued
at its original cost. Property rentc~d by the taxpayer is valued at eight times
the net annual rental rate. Net annual rental rate is the annual rental rate
paid by the taxpayer lc:;.s any annual rental rate received by the taxpayer
from subrentals.
25131. Average value of property. The average value of property
shall be determined by averaging the values at the beginning and ending
of the income year .but the Franchise Tax Board may require the
averaging of monthly values during t,lte income year if reasonably
required to reflect properly the average value of the ta:q>ayer's property.
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thi~

25132. Payroll factor--defined. The pa)'Toll factor is a fraction, the
numerator of which is the total amount paid in this state during the
income year by the taxpayer for con,pensation, and the denominator of
which is the total compensation paid everywhere dming the income year.
25133. Compensation. Compensati:m is paid in this state if:
(a) The individual's service is performed entirely within the state; or
(b) The individual's service is performed both within and without the
state, but the service performed without the state is incidental to the
individual's service within the state; or
(c) Some of the service is performed in the state and (1) the base of
operations or, if there is no base of operations, the place from which the
service is directed or controlled is in the state, or (2} the b2se of operations
or the place from which the service is directed or controlled is not in any
state in which some part of the service is performed, but the individual's
residence is in this state.
25134. Sales £actor--defined. The sales factor is a fraction, the
numerator .of which is the total sales of the tax1Jayer in this state during
the income year, and the denominator of which is the total sales
taxpRver everywhere during the income year.

25135. Sales ofhmgible personal property. Sales of tangible personal
property are in this .state if:
(a) The property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser, other than the
United States government, within this state regardless of the f.o.b. point
or other conditions of the sale; or
(b) The property is shipped from an office, store, warehouse, factory,
or other place of storage in this stale and (1) the purchaser is the United
States government or (2) the taxpayer is not taxable in the state of the
purchaser.
25136. Other sales. Sales, other than sales of tangible personal
property, are in this state if:
(a) The income-producing activity is performed in this state; or
{b) 'I11e income-producing activity is performed both in and outside this
state and a greater prorzortion of the income-producing acti\·ity is
performed in this state than in any other state, ba<,ed on costs of
performance.
Pert~ rno:'<~-'foc"v••d ov!,id•

Ccr:L;_ ..... ;o_-~ ··the

a~'><.~r:.bly,

in
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, JHm"'J' 11, !978.
~ or..tJ ~;;han of ~nt...:>h9·~-J. d..,b, !<...C~;r1tiet..--- ln
~rmula,. th<" uring "tcncy prop-rly !.-r.ob--d S<-ction
lo
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We
a number of problems
which we may not
would be happy to discuss
this matter further with you or members of your
As
as you are
this
, we will
discuss it with any other party
without your direction or concurrence.
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as to the
we
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hear
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ect

P. Deddeh

2
Required
Tax Rate

Number of

worth

8,467

0.14%

$358.5 billion

estimated the increase in the bank and corporation tax rate
all
and (2) multinationals only that would be
to raise replacement revenues.
Number of
Corporations

Amount (est.)

Additional
Tax Rate

(1) State Net Income All Corporations

154,468

$20 billion

2.5%

(2) State Net Income Multinationals
only

8,682

$10 billion

5.0%

The
of imposing a higher rate on nonmultinational corporations not benefiting from AB 1238 (at least in the short run) is doubtful.

Factor

Number of
Multinationals

Amount

Required
Tax Rate

7,564

$330.3 billion

0.15%

7,565

49.6 billion

1.01%

$209.8 billion

0.24%

To the extent
such supplemental taxes as disincentives
for California
, corresponding revenue would be less than expected.
Also, efforts by
to minimize the impact of an additional tax on
,
, or sales would simultaneously cause a reduction in
franchise tax revenues over what would otherwise result by reducing
numerator factors used in the apportionment formula.
Indeed, any
tax on
property in California may be contested on
grounds as possibly violating Article XIII A property tax
limitations.
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APPENDIX VI

"Oil Companies' Disappearing Profits:
A Case for the Unitary Method",

•

by Ken Cory, in Tax Notes,
May 25, 1981

60

E

IL

IES'

Dl

TH

•

to avoid state taxation, and the added burdens this places
on other state taxpayers as the states scramble to find
added revenues to finance their new responsibilities .
oil profits require a reexamination of the international oil companies'
to avoid state taxation and
force smaller, less
businesses to
share of the taxes. The Citizen/labor
recently issued a report
the
from state revenue

Controller of the State of Calithe Chairman of the California Franchise
is
the chairman of the
Commission and oversees Calitaxation based on world-

" ... In 1979, Conoco, Amoco, Exxon and Mobil paid
state income taxes
0.3 percent, 0.4
percent, 0.9
and 1.4 percent of their total
corporate
in state income taxes, respectively.
These figures are less than the rate paid by the
average famiiy of four
$16,000 the year
before.

as an
mulfistate and multinational corpora~
avoid state income taxes
states that the arm'sthe use transfer
method of taxation is no match for the
transactions of major corporations. He
the imposition of federal limits on the
method would
threaten
and aggravate their

" .. . In Colorado,
Service reported no
taxable income
1978, O?l>.<:rl•HR combined sales in
the state of $33. 7 million.
" ... Wisconsin fared even
Exxon, Gulf, Tenneco
Union of
alleging that their oil business in the state was a
proposition, and therefore
no state
income taxes."
With other industries

has

at
the

a greater burden, the
the international oil
matter. Some states have
by using sales taxes on
Such taxes hardly address
falls directly and
sophisticated approach is

the shock of energy prices
governments to carry
effective state taxation of
has become a very serious
to get at the problems
or gross receipts taxes.
since their burden

Transfer Price Shell Game
The states'
in
around what are calied "transfer
" These are the
prices that one division or corporate subsidiary of a
vertically
company
other divisions or
less apparent but no less real.
as the Administration
return a
share of
to the states. A great deal has
the failure of the international oil
their share of federal income taxes, but
written about ir1e increased tax burden
other businesses. Even less has been
of the international oil companies

Rising oil profits
International oil
state taxation .. ..

of the
avoid
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overall corporate
state to state, in
of the corporation's
the basis of the
within the jurislaxation is not without
determining what is
agreed that a
do little or no
treated as a unitary
rental operation
in another is
chain a state
earned by the
closer cases where the
be reasonably
clear and
operated as
reality that is

for the

to tolerate
but they
of multinational
the worldwide
determine what
unfair taxation o(
the point. The

determine what part of
multistate or multibeen earned
earned outside the
contribution did the
earnings of the
question for any
obvious that the

method, multisuccessful in prostates to use the
a bitter fight in

May 25, 1181

the Senate over a provision in the United Kingdom Tax
Treaty limiting the unitary method. Ultimateiy a reservation to the provision prevailed by a close margin. The
unitary method has also withstood a number of broadbased
challenges. In two recent cases-brought by
Mobil and Exxon-the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
of the unitary method and rejected claims
that worldwide apportionment amounts to double
taxation.

It is worth noting that the federal government has similar
problems in dealing with transfer prices and a strong
argument can be made for the use of the unitary approach
by the internal Revenue Service. While the U.S. Treasury
Department supported the U.K. Tax Treaty and the
Mathias bill, it has used the unitary approach itself.
Unfortunately, the IRS has not done so systematically,
and it certainly has not done so with the international oil
companies.
With the rapid increase in both energy prices and
profits, we simply have no choice but to find an effective
means of taxing the international oil companies. It is
irrational to rely on a system that permits 40 percent of
manufacturing profits to remain out of the range of
effective taxation. To ask that the states do so in the
context of the current economic policies borders on
madness. It requires other businesses whose profits are
already suffering to bear more than their share of the
burden. The unitary method may not be a perfect solution,
but it is a reasonable, workable, and equitable approach
and at the moment we have no other.

It Is Irrational to rely on a system that permits
40 percent of manufacturing profits to remain
out of the range of effective taxation.

These courtroom defeats have encouraged the oil
companies and multinationals to focus their opposition to
the unitary method on legislative remedies. Republican
Sen. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., and Rep. Barber Conable,
the ranking Republican on the House Ways and Means
Committee, have introduced legislation to prevent states
from using the unitary method to tax multinational corporations. Needless to say, the bills have very powerful
support. Advocates of the bills are now interested in
attaching some form of the legislation to the pending
tax-cut bill. This strategy could force Congress to consider the unitary method in a loaded political setting that
would hardly be conducive to a deliberate exploration of
the issues.

READER COMMENTS WELCOMED
. We'd lika to publish reader comments on this
article in our "Letters to the Editor" column. If
you'd like to make your views known, please write
us promptly.
Please note that letters must be signed, and that
we reserve the right to edit them in the interest of
brevity. However, the full texts of all letters that we
receive will be made available in the Tax Notes
Microfiche Edition.

-1-------------------------~------------------------CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS

MATSUNAGA BILL WOULD GIVE INVESTMENT CREDIT TO
RACE HORSE BREEDING SYNDICATES. The Senate Finance

announcement. The bills to be considered at the hearing
include the following:
• Abolition of Estate Tax. S. 404 would repeal the
federal estate and gift tax.
• Exclusion; Marital Deduction. S. 395 would increase
the federal estate and gift tax exclusion to $600,000
and provide an unlimited marital deduction.
• Exclusion; Use Valuation. S. 858 would increase the
federal estate and gift tax exclusion to $600,000 and
revise the rule relating to the special use valuation of
farmland.
• Marital Deduction. S. 574 would allow a marital
deduction of up to $750,000 and would "provide a
similar deduction for heirs other than the spouse."
• Crop Share Rentals. S. 23 would "make it clear that
crop share rentals qualify as a standard of valuation
under section 2032A."
• Retroactive Use Valuation. S. 557 would allow estates
that filed estate tax returns before July 13, 1978, to
elect the special use valuation for farmland.
• Gift Tax Reporting. S. 995 would permit the reporting
of gift tax on an annual basis.

Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management held a
postponed
last week on a series of "miscellaneous" tax bills.
Tax Notes, May 11, 1981, p. 1064for
a
of the bills considered at the hearing.)
In
to the bills previously scheduled for a
hearing, the Finance Subcommittee also heard testimony
on S. 450, a bill introduced by Finance Committee member
Spark Matsunaga, D-Hawaii, which would grant an investment tax credit to persons who invest up to $100,000 in
"work and breeding horses." The principal beneficiaries of
the bill would be investors in race horse breeding syndicates. Doc 81-4843
ESTATE TAX HEARINGS TO CONTINUE. Sen. Steven D.

Symms. A-Idaho, the Chairman of the Senate Finance
Subcommittee on Estate and Gift Taxation, has announced that his subcommittee will continue its hearings
on major estate tax issues on June 5. For earlier coverage
of the Subcommittee's hearings, see Tax Notes, May 11,
1981, pp, 1079-1080, and April 27, 1981, p. 952.
The June 5 hearing will "focus on particular problems of
the estate and gift tax laws, including the special use
valuation for farm property and the interaction of estate
lax laws with the gift tax," according to the hearing

Persons wishing to testify at the June 5 hearing must
submit requests in writing to the Finance Committee not
later than May 29, 1981. Doc 81-4844
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Excerpt, Comptroller General's
Report to the House Committee on
Ways and Means, on the Subject
of Determining the Income of
Multinational Corporations,
September 30, 1981
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U.S. TAX INTERESTS
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IRS COULD BETTER PROTECT

DIGES'l'

Multinational corporations have both the incentive and the opportunity to shift income
between jurisdictions to take advantage of
disparate corporate tax rates.
One incentive
is minimization of taxes.
The opportunity
lies in the pricing of interorganizational
transactions. Obviously, possession of incentive and opportunity does not axiomatically
lead to abuse--but to tax administrators, American and foreign, it represents a vulnerability
to guard against.
IRS, however, has not yet developed baseline
information on the incidence and magnitude of
multinational corporation noncompliance in
terrns of improper shifting of income.
Thus,
IRS ·has no sound basis for determining the
amount of audit resources to be assigned to
address the problem, nor for gauging the success of those resources that are applied to it.
Further, IRS enforcement difficulties are
compounded by the complexities involved in
measu ing the amount of income misallocated
in those instances where this is believed to
have occurred.
Ideally, interorganizational
pr
ing i
to be adjusted to that for similar
transact ns between unrelated parties--the socalled "arm's length standard."
However, in the modern economic system of multinational corporate business, a true arm's
length price can rarely be identified. When
an arm's length price cannot be identified,
rtrnent of Treasury regulations for Internal Revenue Code Section 482 provide both the
corporate taxpayer and the IRS examiner some
guidance for arriving at a constructed price.
The regulations and the resulting enforcement
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1~31

process, hGivcver, create an unacc
,-;)) 1 e 1 ,_·v•?l of
uncertainty and a sirjnificdnt <H1m ist_r~1Live burden both for corporate t_axpayers and lHS ex.:JHd_ners ·
For example, there is often no similar transaction on which to est_ablish an arm's length
price.
In these instances, the Treasury regulations do not provid~ corpo~ate taxpayers with
sufficient certainty for planning their financial strategies and considering the tax consequences of their pricing of intercorporate
transactions.
IRS, faced with the same lack
of certainty, must construe£ an est
ed price
for adjustment purposes.
Both corporate taxpayers and IRS examiners have characterized the
end result of the adjustment process as being
unpredictable •.
The Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee
asked GAO to study section 482 e forcement.
GAO
reviewed current IRS examinat
ata on 519 U.S.
multinational corporations, each! ~ving assets
over $250 million and each having engaged in
transactions with their foreign subsidiaries.
GAO found that only 3 percent (12 of 403) of IRS'
total recommended section 482 adjustments to reported income for such transactions were based on
a true arm's length price.
These adjustments
amounted to 3 percent ($7.4 million of a total
$277.5 million increase) of the total income adjusted for section 482 issues.
The tax impact
of the total $277.5 million in adjustments, while·
not known precisely, can be estimated using a corporate tax rate of 48 percent at
$ 33.2
million. (Seep. 29.)
While IRS has only limited resources, the number and volume of complex international intercorporate transactions as well as the amounts
of income involved continue to grow.
In the
short term, IRS and Treasury should, GAO believes, make several specific improvements in
the way they presently administer section 482.
In addition, IRS should consider ways to get
a measure of corporate noncompliance regarding
arm's length pricing, and Treasury should begin
a study to ascertain whether ways exist to make
section 482 enforcement easier to
ister,
more certain, and more equitable for all concerned.
(See pp. 24 and 53 to 54.
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IRS CAN

S-t::cTi\SN-

H1PROVE ITS CURRENT
-4~f2--ENl:~Ol{CEN~i'>T-i'--AC'l' l VITI ES

IRS needs more management information than it
now has to measure what it is doing to enforce
section 482 against what needs to be done.
Lacking such information, IRS cannot determine
with reasonable assurance the impact of its
current efforts nor adjust its strategy as may
be necessary to make the best use of its limited resources.
Considerable information is available within
IRS concerning IRS' enforcement activities and
the operations of multinational corporations,
but this information has not been analyzed to
answer management's needs.
The case-by-case
results of IRS' section 482 enforcement activities are documented in various reports prepared
during the examination and appeals processes.
Information on the operations of multinational
corporations is also available to IRS from the
Form 2952 which must be submitted by U.S. corporations for each foreign subsidiary they control.
(See pp. 9 to 11.)
Other information IRS needs is not so readily
available.
For example, IRS needs a better
idea of the extent of noncompliance with section 482 regulations that exists within the
universe of multinational corporations.
IRS has, in the past, shown that it can respond
to similar problems in developing management
strategies where unknown factors exist.
IRS
now needs to focus its expertise on ways to
obtain a better measure of the total noncompliance with section 482 that exists in the
multinational corporate universe.
(Seep. 11.)
MENTS

SHOULD BE EXTENDED

IRS examiners use the form 2952 as their starting point for most examin.:1.tions involving international transactions.
Data provided on this
forrn is critical t_o the successful identification of many' section 482 adjustments.
Section
67

6038 of t.he Internc:tl Rev(:nue C:ode aut"hc;ri ,··s 1!\S
to :ccquire this information only frnrn lJ. S. p<n·,,nt
corporations, but similar infonna t ion i ~; a J ~;o
needed for U.S. subsidiaries of fon.:-ir3n p<1rents.
In 1974 there were 6,538 controlled u.s. corporations with assets totaling more than $76 billion. GAO believes that having similar information
readily available for these types of corporations
would enhance IRS' identification and examination
of section 482 issues in international transactions
between U.S. subsidiaries and their foreign parents.
(See pp. 18 to 20.)

TREASURY SHOULD ADJUST THE
SAFE HAVEN RATE AS NECESSARY
-·-----TO MORE CLOSELY REFLECT THE
REAL COST OF BORROWING

·-·-~--~-··----

Another·needed change concerns the use of the
safe haven interest rate, a
ed rate of interest which IRS examiners are
rmitted to use
in lieu of an arm's length price in certain
types of transactions as a basis for making income adjustments. The economic cl
te since
1968 has produced rapidly changing interest
rates on the open market.
The safe haven interest rates established by Treasury have not
kept pace.
(See pp. 15 to 16.}
GAO's analysis showed that 83 of the 84 section
482 adjustments involving loan or advance transactions made between August 1972 and June 1975
in its sample were based on a safe haven interest rate of 5 percent.
During the period when
these adjustments were made, the prime interest
rate was always higher than the 5 percent rate,
ranging from a low of 5.25 to a high of 12 percent.
Treasury implemented a new, higher adjustment rate of 12 percent in Ju
, 1981. This new
rate has already been overtaken by the continuous
rise in the cost of money which has seen the prime
rate reach about 20 percent.
(Seep. 17.)
Safe haven interest rates which are substantially lower than the open market rate can result in U.S. corporations reporting less income for tax purposes. Further, such safe
haven rates are unfair from the perspective of
those U.S. corporations which cannot use them.
Thus, GAO believes Treasury should adjust the
safe haven rate as often as nece snry to lfl·"1ke
the rate realistically reflect the cost of Lorrowing on the open market.
(See pp. 23 to 24.)
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Making income adjustments using the arm's
length standard has posed administrative burdens on both IRS and corporate taxpayers.
Because of the structure of the modern business world, IRS can seldom find an arm's
length price on which to base adjustments
but must instead construct a price. A constructed price is at best an estimate.
Because Treasury regulations do not provide
sufficient guidance, corporate taxpayers
lack reasonable assurance concerning how
income on intercorporate transactions that
cross national borders will be adjusted and
the enforcement process is difficult and
time-consuming for both IRS and taxpayers.
The current regulations provide some guidance
for those instances in which an arm's length
price cannot be identified but, too frequently,
the examiner must use considerable judgment in
dealing with data that does not directly relate
to the specific situation at hand. Adjustments
in which an examiner was able to identify an
arm's length price resulted in only 3 percent
($7.4 of $277.5 million) of total adjusted income and constituted only 3 percent (12 of 403)
of all section 482 adjustments in GAO's sample.
Adjustments for 87 percent of total adjusted income were based on the safe haven rules and various alternative techniques permitted by the
regulations. The remaining adjustments were arrived at by methods which could not be determined from available documentation or were not
applicable to the arm's length standard.
(See
p. 29.)

Whether or not an arm's length price is obtainable, administering the regulations is a complex proces~;. An examiner must identify questionable transactions, perform a functional
analysis, and search for a comparable uncontrolled price.
If such a pri~e is not identifiable, the exurniner must construct one using
alternative techniques. The process as a
whole t_hus c1.eates administrative burden and
a degree of uncertainty that is unacceptable
for both examiner and taxpayer.
{See pp. 36
to 40.)
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For some time, parties affected by and
know] c:dgeabl e about arm's 1 Pngth adjust It lent s--corporate taxpayers, courts, experts in the
field, and officials at IRS--have criticjzcd
section 482 enforcement unrler ihe current
regulations on the basis t.hat ( 1) tlle .:-i!lalytical approach to determining d rrn' s 1 engt h
prices often leads to unreasonable results and
(2) the examinations require extensive corporate expense and labor.
In addition, a substantial body of expert opinion and several
court decisions have also criticized the high
degree of burden and uncertainty posed by the
current regulations.
(See pp. 43 to 4 7. )
IRS examiners told GAO they believe that, under
the current regulations, some r
ential section
482 adjustments are not being d(;ve1oped.
They
stated that section 482 work is
"high risk
venture" where much audit work can result in
little additional tax.
'They pointed out t.hat,
because of this, some examiners might not develop a section 482 adjustment because of the
difficulty involved in reaching an agreement
on an arm's length price or on the basis for
making the adjustment.
IRS examiners attrjbuted
this situation to both the difficulties in the
enforcement process and the time it takes to do
the work.
(See pp. 40 to 43. )
GAO's statistics on the section 482 adjustments
IRS made can be interpreted to lend some credence to the examiners' comments.
For example:
--Only 200 of the 519 multinational corporations in GAO's sample had section 482 adjustments involving their foreign subsidiaries.
--The bulk of the total $277.5 million was concentrated in only a few of the 403 total adjustments.
Eleven of the 403 adjustments
accounted for over one-half of the $277.5
million.
--Adjustments involving the sale of tangible
property, the category of intercorporate
transact.ion where t.he largest amounts of revenue are at issue, were also concentrated.
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'l'hirty-five u.s. parents ann 89 of their foreign subsidiaries experienced adjustments on
tangible property sales of $4.4 billion.
The
other 12,248 foreign subsidiaries of the 519
U.S. parents experienced no adjustments to a
total of $28.1 billion in intercorporate
sales transRctions.
(Seep. 42.)
Neither GAO nor IRS knows how m~ch noncompliance
exists, nor how many more adjustments IRS should
have made.
However, given the difficulty inherent in administering section 482 through the current Treasury regulations, the examiners' statements, and the statistics on the adjustments
IRS made, it can reasonably be concluded that
the potential for greater enforcement exists.
In the early 1970s, Trensury considered several
regulation changes in response to criticism
made at that time.
The changes, however, were
not implemented.
Today the need is even greater
for Treasury to consider revising the regulations
than it was a decade ago.
A 1981 study undertaken at the joint request of IRS, Treasury, and
the Department of Justice has also recommended revising the regulations to reduce administrative
burden and increase certainty, thus lending support to GAO's conclusions (p. 43.)
Tax experts and corporate taxpayers have suggested that Treasury reconsider the appropriateness of the arm's length standard in an
economic world more complex than that which
existed when the standard was adopted in 1934.
For example, one alternative suggested is to
expand the use of the safe haven concept, thus
creating greater certainty.
Another alternative frequently suggested is the use of formulas for apportioning income in certain situations.
Apportionment formulas are presently
used by 45 States, and some experts believe
these formulas, when applicable, reflect market
realities better than the arm's length standard.
{Sec pp. 50 to 52.)
A major objection to the use of formula apportionment across national borders is that tax
treaties between the U.S. and other nations
specify the arm's length standard for adjusting
corporate income.
For the U.S. to adopt a different method could result in multinational
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corporatjons incurrjng dnubJc L1x-1tion.
C/\0
recognizes the s i<Jlli fi C<l nee of Lh is p:r obJ, 'm.

(Seep. 52.)
GAO suggests that IRS consider wuys to get a
measure of noncompliance and that 'frei:l~>ury be
the focal point for a study to identify ways to
improve the guidance provided concerning section
482 enforcement. After IRS and Treasnry have
crn•pleted this work, Treasury should be able
to make an informed decision as to whether and
how to change the section 482 regulations.
(Seep. 53.)
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSIONER
---·----OF INTERNAL REVENUE
IRS presently lacks sufficient information to
assess the effectiveness of its section 482 enforcement and design future st ategy with informed judgment. The need to
ke informed
strategy decisions will assume c en greater importance in the future as the number of intercorporate transactions continues to grow in disproportion to IRS' limited resources.
To place
the Service in a position to make informed decisions regarding how best to deploy those resources,
GAO recommends that the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue:
--Aggregate and analyze existing data from a_
management perspective, consider ways to get
a measure of noncompliance, and establish
procedures for continuously assessing the appropriateness of IRS' section 482 enforcelflent
strategy.
GAO also made other recommendations to improve
IRS' enforcement activities (p. 25.)
RECOMMENDATIONS •ro THE SECRETARY
OF THE 'rREASURY
'fhe current Treasury regulations for implementing code section 482 create uncertainty and administrative burden for both IRS and corporate
taxpayers.
Since better guidelines are needed,
GAO recoMnends that the Secretary of the Treasury:
-- Begin a study to identify and eva1 uate the
feasibility of ways to allocat.e income unr1 {~r
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S<'''ti()n IJ(;), :irwludin•J formul;c1 apportionment,
whic:h would lesst'n thL' present uncertainty
and administrative burden created by the existing regulations.

GAO also

recorrr~,ended

that the Secretary:

--Adjust the safe haven interest rate as frequently as necessary to realistically reflect
the current costs of borrowing on the open
market.
RECOMMENDATION TO THE CONGRESS
To provide IRS the authority to require the information it needs from foreign-controlled u.s.
corporations, GAO recommended that the Congress
amend section 6038 of the Internal Revenue Code
to further provide that every United States
person, as presently defined by the code, shall
furnish such information as the Secretary may
prescribe by regulation with respect to any
foreign corporation which controls such person.
AGENCY COf'.1MENTS AND GAO'. S EVALUATION
Treasury agreed in principle with GAO's conclusions
and recommendations concerning the need to more
frequently adjust the safe haven interest rate.
Treasury stated that a change in the current safe
haven rate Wcts made on July 1, 1981, and it anticipated that the rate in the future will be ~djusted
periodically so as to reflect major changes in intere~:;t costs.
Both Treasury and IRS generally agreed with GAO's
recommen(!ations concerning spf:cific improvements
that need to be made to current section 482 enforcement procedures.
However, both agencies expressed disagreement with the recommendation that
Treasury undertake a study to identify ways to lessen the uncertainty and administrative burden created by the existing regulations.
In so doing,
both a0nncics, GAO believes, minimized the seriousness of the difficulties which section 482 enforcement has prescnte~ and continues to present all
affected parties.
As GAO noted, uncertainty as well
as the administrative difficulties and burden on all
parties affected by section 482 enforcement have
been documented in a11 previous studies on the subject, tlv:· mo~;t recent being a January 1981 study
undertaken ;~t the joint rt~·quest of t.he IRS Cornmiss i o:u:or, the A .s i sta nt Attorney Genera 1, and the Assi_st;,nt Sf'•-'l<'tdry of t~H~ Tro:-1~-:ury for T.:>x Po] icy.
(See pp. 54 to 57.)
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CHAP'l'ER 3
HOW CAN SECTION 482 ENFORCEMENT BE MADE
MORE CERTAIN AND LESS ADf.HNISTRATIVELY
BURDENSOME?

TRE:ASURY SHOULD SEEK THE

ANS~·IER

Adjusting multinational intercorporate transactions for tax
purposes under current section 482 regulations is administratively burdensome for both IRS and the corporate taxpayer.
Moreover,
the consioerable amount of judgment necessary in most income adjustments recommended under the regulations creates uncertainty.
In recent years, the regulations ·have been a source of dissatisfaction to all parties affected, including the courts.
In essence, section 482 enforcement is criticized because
the theory on which it rests no longer corresponds to the realities of intercorporate transactions.
In theory, a section 482
adjustment should be made when income reported for a multinational intercorporate transaction vari,s from the comparable uncontrolled price of a similar transaction between two unrelated
businesses. The comparable uncontrolled price is the arm's
length price for the transaction.
In practice, however, IRS
examiners .have difficulty finding a comparable uncontrolled
price for most transactions. Of the examinations we reviewed,
only 3 percent {12 of 403) of IRS' recommended adjustments between parents and foreign subsidiaries were based on comparable
uncontrolled prices. The income adjusted through these arm's
length prices amounted to only 3 percent of the total income adjusted for section 482 issues.
The regulations provide some guidance for those instances
where an arm's length price cannot be identified but, too frequently, the examiner must use considerable judgment in analyzing extensive data which often does not directly relate to the
specific situation at hand.
To the extent that the facts do not
directly relate, the adjustment price becomes estimated.
Tax experts and corporate taxpayers have suggested that
Treasury reconsider the appropriateness of the arm's length
standard in an economic world more complex than that which
existed when the standard was adopted in 1934. For example, one
alternative suggested is the use of formulas for apportioning
income in certain situations. Apportionment formulas are presently used by the States, and some experts believe these formulas, when applicable, reflect market realities better than the
arm's length standard.
Another alternative frequently suggested
is to expand the use of the safe haven concept, thus, creating
greater certainty.
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L11is p!·uc;pc·~:t s1luu1d dt•! ·~r Treasury from stw1ying whether al-

t<:rnativcs, or a t-::<·i;ibin<'ition of alternative and present approilchcs, could make section 482 enforcement adrninist.rat.ively
easier, more <crtain, and more equitable for all concerned.
I HS l"'LAKES l:\EL/I.Tl VEIN FEW
ADJUST!•1ENTS ON THE BASIS OF
COMPARABLE INDEPENDENT PRICES
~------'-··~---- ·----~- --·-------~-------

The 1968 regulations issued by Treasury provided IRS with
guidelines for rnaking section 482 income adjustment.s.
The regulations explain the arm's length standard, the principle underlying section 482 adjustments, as follows:
"The purpose of section 482 is to place a controlled
taxpayer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer,
by determining, according to the standard of an uncontrolled taxpayer, the true taxable income from the property and business of a controlled taxpayer * * *·
The
standard to be applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another
uncontrolled taxpayer."
For example, uncontrolled transactions with respect to the transfer of tangible property are defined as
--sales by an member of the controlled group to unrelated
businesses,
--sales to a member of the controlled group by unrelated
businesses, and
-~sales

in which the businesses are not members of the
controlled group and are not related to each other.

IRS first tries to identify independent transactions which
are exactly comparable or so nearly identical to the transaction in question as to have no effect on price.
In the absence
of such independent transactions, the regulations permit IRS to
use other alternative techniques to apply the arm's length standard.
The alternative techniques generally involve constructing
adjustment prices based on independent transactions that fall
short of being exactly comparable or nearly identical to the
transaction in question.
The regulations provide guidelines for
making adjustments to the following five categories of intercorporate transactions:
{1) sale of tangible property, (2) transfer
or use of int.angible property, (3) loans and advances, (4) performance of services, and (5) use of tangible property (rent).
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The regulat.ions permit the use of a 1 terna t i vc technique's for a<-'1justments in all five categories of transactions when a comparable uncontrolled price cannot be found.
The regulations also
require the use of safe haven rules under certain conditions for
transactions in categories ( 3)
4)
5).
1

(

1

(

Our study showed that few section 482 adjustments are made
using prices based on comparable uncontrolled transactions.
As
shown in the following table only 3 percent of the 403 IRS recommended section 482 adjustments were based on arm's length prices
det.e nnined through cot:1parab le uncontrolled transactions.
The 403
adjustments involved 200 of the 519 multinational corporations in
our data base and their controlled foreign corporations. !/
Basis ~or ad ustment
4roounts determined through
Comparable uncontrolled
transactions
Alternative techniques
Safe haven rules
Total
Other:
Not determinable from
report (note a)
Not applicable (note b}
Total
~/Information

Number of
adjustments

Adjusted
amount

Percent

12
107
240

3
26
60

359

89

25
19

6
5

403

100

$

Percent

7,384,342
181,2511869
-6 0_,_:1- l 0_0.__§_9_

3
65
22

249,0461980

90

71592,307
20,855,126
--

3
7

---"--~-----·---

----·--·--·--~--

100

--

not shown in records we examined.

b/Use of section 482 to make adjustments where neither safe haven
-rules nor arm's length prices were applicable.
For example, returning total income to the U.S. because of sham foreign subsidiary.
As shown above, 26 percent of the section 482 adjustments
were made using alternative techniques.
These require an even
greater degree of subjective judgment by the examiner than does

1/IRS also made other section 482 adjustments amounting to $330
million which involved 235 of the 519 corporations.
We.~ did
nol analyze these adjustments because the:, transactions did not
involve a controlled foreign corporation.
However, 200 of the
235 corporations are the sa.me corporation~~ repre~;ented in our
str-J.tistics because they also had adjustt,l~?nts involving their
foreign subsidiaries.
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In the next f~w pages we describe in greater detail the
kinds of alterniiUve techniques aviiilable to IRS examiners in
r:H1justing incoHte for the five cn.te<Jories of intercorporate transactions.
Our discussion shows that the application ·of alternative techniques where no comparable uncontrolled price can be
found creates administrative difficulties and uncertainty for
both IRS and the corporate taxpayer.
In most cases, the adjustJnent that results from applying th~ alternative techniques is
based on data that does not directly relate to the specific situation at hand.
!"!~st ad ust._:nents _in'v'_~l_'v'_i~<;t
_t.he_~(:l--~---of_ t_?_ng_~b.l_~ y_r_c::peE!:_Y
involve cons id_~r a ~~_c::__juc_!9rl_le.l2!:

IRS considers tangible property adjustments to be the most
important of the five categories discussed in the regulations
because the largest amounts of revenue are involved.
Tangible
property adjustments in our data base amounted to 45 percent
($125.1 of $277.5 million) of the total income adjusted by IRS
under section 482.
Wnen a comparable uncontrolled price for a tangible property adjustment cannot be identified, the regulations direct examiners to apply the resale price method, then the cost plus
method, and finally a fourth method defined as "some appropriate
method."
(See app. III for a description of these pr ing methods).
These methods must be applied in sequence until an appropriate basis for an adjustment is found.
Our statistics show that IRS was able to identify prices
established through comparable uncontrolled transactions in only
15 percent (5 of 34) of its tangible property adjustments.
Even
rnore revealing is that the adjustment amounts based on comparable
uncontrolled transactions represented only about 2 percent ($2.3
of $124.2 million) of the tangible property income which was adjusted by IRS through determinable methods.
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Prici

method

Comparable uncontrolled
transactions
Resale price method
Cost-plus method
Any other method
Total

Adjuslmcnts
Nur,\ber Percent
5
4
9
16

15
12
26
47

34

--

Not determinable
'Total

A!ctUU tl t

Total
$

--

-~

Percenl

2,347,236
7,801,901
7,229,240
106,796,497

2
6
6
86

100

964,019

3
37

125

-

Information in the reports IRS provided us was not sufficient to determine the pricing method used for 3 of the 37
adjustments.
However, only 5 of the remaining 34 adjustments
were made using prices obtained from comparable uncontrolled
transactions. When comparable uncontrolled transactions could
not be identified, IRS examiners most often used the fourth or
"any other" method.
Thus, 86 percent
f the income adjustments
resulting from the sale of tangible prc~erty were made using
that method for which the regulations provide the least guidance.
The following examples taken from reports prepared by IRS
economists and international examiners on examination cases we
reviewed illustrate the amount of work and the considerable degree of judgment required of an examiner.
Co
A, a U.S. parent, sold component parts and
rna er a s
o its foreign subsidiaries.
The foreign subsidiaries assembled finished or semifinished devices that
they sold back to the u.s. parent.
The economist could not
identify comparable uncor1trolled transactions within the
controlled group because the U.S. parent and the foreign
subsidiaries made no similar sales to unrelated parties.
Also, the economist was unable to find comparable uncontrolled transactions outside the controlled group because
the multinational corporation's interaffiliate transactions
were in a form contrary to normal trade practices.
The
economist found that normal trade practices in that industry would have the U.S. parent providing without charye the
component parts and materials to the foreign subsidiaries
which, in turn, would function as contract assemblers and
be paid for the services provided.
The econor:1ist developed
an adjustment based on an analysis of what would be an appropciate amount (labor costs plus profit) to reiniliurse the
foreign subsidi.<7ries for assembling the
t~·r,y; sold to the
U.S. parent corpordtion.
The econor,ic>t, in corc•putin9 the
adjuo;tit'•~nts, used profit nk1rg.Ln pE:~rc~::nt<'lfJ s obtained frCJ[[l
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in s ev.::ral impor·t ant a rea s.
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Corporation B, a U.S. parent, sold chemicals to a foreign
conEr=-offe_d_dTstributor corporation at a markup of 10 percent over mAnufacturing costs. The examiner could not
identify comparable uncontrolled transactions within the
controlled group because no similar sales were made to unrelated parties.
The examiner developed the adjustment
b2sed on the yross profit percentages that selected indepenr1ent (t~hird party) U.S. distrihut_ors earned selling the
U.S. parent corporat~ion' s chemicals.
Ho•.-Jever, the examiner
adjusted the independent U.S. distributors' profit percentage using three factors to compensate for differences in
the operations of the independent distributors and the foreign controlled distributor.
The examiner made the adjustments based on a gross margin of 36.3 percent computed as
follows:
Gross profit
percentage

Factors

u.s.

distributors' gross margin
Differences in
Sales function
Warehousing function
Markets
Total

27.7
4.1
0.5
4.0
36.3
'

The ex
ner identified the differences in operations after
considerable discussion with representatives of the corporation.
Because the foreign-controlled distributor was
located in a tax haven country, i t was to the u.s. parent
corporation's benefit to have its foreign distributor's
gross profit percentage as high as possible. Therefore,
the U.S. corporation officials argued that the different
factor percentages should be higher.
The examiner stated
in his report that the adjustment made could not be tied
down to a realistic, factual situation.
As shown below, the results of our analysis of IRS adjustments to sales of tangible property are not dramatically d.ifferent from those of other studies:
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Percent of acl
St:_udy

usi.n yr_ic·i
Aiterna t-:(ve met.hoc1 s

LlStTl1C'tltS

rnc· t_·h ()Cl

-\
Year of Comparable
study uncontrolled Resale Plus Other Total Total
--------~-----

Conference
Board
(note a)
1972
Department of
Treasury
(note b)
1973
Indiana
University
(note c)
1980

----~

28

13

23

36

72

100

21

11

27

41

79

100

24

14

30

32

76

100

a/Michael G. Duerr, Tax Allocations and International Business:
-- Co_r p_~F ate _E: xp~ r i_~~c e ______e_::;_:_____ ~----------- n_e_r__r_~~l____________________ _
Code, (New York: The Conference Board, l972l. The
n erence
Board is an independent, nonprofit business research organization.

c/Jane 0. Burns, "How IRS Applies the Intercompany Pricing Rules
- o f Section 482:
A Corporate Survey," Journal of Taxation, 54
(May 1980), 308-14.
Dr. Burns, presen
of Business, Indiana University, is a former Vice-President of
the American Taxation Association and Treasurer of the American
Accounting Association's International Accounting Section.

Intangible property includes such things as patents, inventions, trademarks, brand names, and technical data.
(See app.
IV.)
Ownership of valuable intangible property can provide a
corporation with a corapetitive advantage and re'.vards which enable above normal profits.
Similar to adjustments involving tangible property pricing,
intangible prop~rty adjust.rnents were based on comparable uncontroJ led transact ions.
IRS recorpmendcc1 73 inta.ngib1 e property
adjus
nts between U.S. parent corpordtions anc] thr~j r for·E·ign
subs id ii1 ries in the exa.mina t ions we rcvievl(:cl.
Ide could not de
te rn ne the method used in making 18 of the adjustments becaus0
the ex<-t'niner's report did not contain sufficient inforrnati_on.
How~'ver, only 3 of the remaining 55 adjustmc:1ts (5 percent) were~
secl on pricc·s obtained from ccw1pctrable uncontroller1 trctn~;ac
tions.
The 3 ac1justmr:nt.s repr<:::r;entecl about 4 pcccE:nt ( $2.3 of
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~;61.1 I>~ilJiun) uf t)d::' ~·Aal
iOUnt ~H3jnsb:d for irtL:n•Jjbl~C ~n_up-
etly.
The L''L.li;d:!<J 52 adjtJSlJ.:cnts Wt?te li~<'HJe Ly the ( ;:·dncr
usin<:J an alle::rnat:ivc iJ'chnique.
t.Yhen a compa1:.able unc(,ntr:ollt.d
p r i c e c a n no t b c f c 11 n d for ,:;. n ad j u s t r:1 c n t i n v o l v j n g i n t a i 1'J i b 1 e
property, the Jt''<jlJlations give the exandner 12 factors to consider in makiny the t:tdjustmc:nt.
The use of lhc::;e fuctors l·cq u i t c· :::; t h a t t he e x ,, n: i n e r c u n s t r u c t t h c ad j u s L me n t p r i c e •
Nu rmally, bo·.;~c"ver, an <.cxami ner does not have to use all 12 factors
before arriving at a basis for the adjustment.

The following example illustrates how a price is constructed
by an IRS economist or an international exa1niner when prices from
COlllpdrable uncontrollc:d tr.:-msactions are not available.
Corporation A, a foreign-controlled U.S. subsidiary, paid
·a t:oy-aTty · r-afe of 9 percent on sales of a drug its fondgn
parent corporation licensed it to manufacture and sell.
The examiner could not identify comparable uncontrolled
transactions to use in making the adjustment because the
foreign parent corporation did not have similar licensing
ugreen1en ts for the drug with unrelated parties.
The ex aminer developed an adjustment that recognized a 5 instead of
a 9 percent rate based on his findings that the drug was
. "second line" rather than "unique and superior" as clai111ed
by the u.s. corporation.
The examiner attributed the drug's
extremely high sales to sensational advertising and unparalleled promotion by the u.s. corporation.
The examiner constructed the 5 percent royalty rate based on the following
information.
a.

Discussion with personnel who negotiated the royalty
rates indicated that over the years the 5 percent
rate had become acceptable to both parties.

b. For many years a rate of return of 5 percent on
financial investment was considered good in the
porate sector.
This factor was one of the main
siderations in arriving at a rate acceptable to
parties.

a
corconboth

c. There had been other studies of drug royalty rates
which indicated that the most common rate charged
was 5 percent.
As a 1979 report by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development pointed out, 1/ it is difficult to identify
comparable uncontrolled transactions since the owner of intangible

1/TrcnsferPricing In Multinational ~~-t!:'~.I2-~J?~~ (Paris:
O:r:ganiza t on-- for -Ec-or)-c)rn:Cc-·e:o-opera tTon- and De: velopr~.en t I . 19 7 9) •
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prop rty, particularly t.hc Oi!.fn,~:r of a paten:_, i~; e~;~;r·nticilly the
owner of a monopoly right which may not be rnc•r1c available to unrelated businesses.

The method most frequently used to make section 482 adjustments in the examinations we reviewed involved the safe haven
rules.
(See app. I.)
Safe haven rules must be used by examiners
to determine adjustment prices or rates only when the corporation makes loans and advances, provides a service, or rents tangible property to its foreign subsidiaries, and then only if the
corporation does not routinely engage in these types of transactions with other parties.
If the corporation is in the business
of making loans and advances, providing similar services or renting similar property to unrelated businesses, the examiner cannot use the safe haven rules and mu ~ try to obtain a price from
a comparable uncontrolled transactioL.
When safe haven rules
can be used, the examiner does not lc~k for a comparable uncontrolled price but immediately refers to the safe haven rules.
The regulations, however, allow a corporation to contest an adjustment made by the safe haven rules.
If a corporation can support an ~rm's length price for the transaction, IRS must accept
the arm's length price rather than one arrived at using the safe
haven rules.
'
Of the 274 adjustments in our data base involving loans and
advances, services, and rents, 240 adjustments (87 percent) were
made using the safe haven rules.
The amount adjusted using the
safe haven rules represented 86 percent ($60.4 of $70.3 million)
of the total amount of income adjusted by IRS for these thre
ca tE:gories of transactions.
(See app. V.)
IRS could not use the safe haven rules to determine the
adjustment price for the remaining 34 adjustments because the
nature of the transaction being adjusted represented an integral
part of the corporation's business.
The amount adjusted in such
instances must be based on an arm's length pr e.
However, similar to adjustments involving tangible and intangible property
pri ing, few of these 34 adjustment_s were made based on prices
obta ned from comparahle uncontrolled transactions.
Information
in the reports we reviewed was not sufficien to dele
ne if
rable uncontrolled prices were used for 4 of the 34 adjustments.
However, only 4 of the remaining 30 adjustments were
based on comparable uncontrolled prices. The four adjustments
represented only 28 percent ($2.7 of $9.8 million) of the total
income adjusted for these three ca
ries of transactions using
techniques other than safe havens.
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;1y <Jlli<1<Jnce i~o ,~:·:, <1inf:>rs
fcjf: tlt:II·C,;itd!,'J lhe lJtice to U
C
for 1Udr1S Clnd (1(]Va 1:C'S 1 e>c•r-vi r:•~s,
nd c nLs ·~~11cn co;..p;yc,,blc: unc<~•ntrolled tr:i'lnsactions c. n-not be i<1 !li:ifiJ•c'l nd sr1fe ha~ven rules cannot be applied. Of
the 30 ddjusU:l<:>nts ::~.:H1e by det~erminable t~echniques oUH:;r i:han
the safe haven rules, 28 involved service category transactions
between U.S. p'lr nts and foreign subsidiaries.
Prices for only
three of th<'~Se 28 ;v] jusLmL:nt.s were hased on cornparable uncont:coll,?d t:c<1.nsactions.
Thus, the remaining 25 service category
transactions we reviewed were adjusted solely on the basis of
examiner discretion.
Income adjusted for the 25 transactions
an,ount.c,d to $6.8 ;ui) lion.
'i'il•!
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rlo ;,•)t l_H:uvi•1,;

PCYC":NT rl\.L l\D,JUS'l''"H:NTS 1v1AY BE f\H~;::;go
L~ i:.i JJt: R ClJ R Rr:N;f·-· S i::C~'r JJ)N ,__ 4.~8 2 R El-; u-LA-ft-6NS

The administrative complexity produced by the current
section 482 regulations may result in potential adjustments
not being made.
'rhc regulations prescribe a complex and timeconsuming process for making adjustments.
First, the examiner
must identify questionable transactions.
If safe haven rules
do not apply, the examiner must perform a functional analysis
of the transactions, search for comparable uncontrolled prices
(which our analysis indicates are rarely obtainable), and then
construct comparable uncontrolled prices using judgment to the
degree needed.
Because examiners work on several cases simultaneously, precise data on the average time required for a section 482 adjustment is lacking.
However, our interviews with
IRS examiners and the statistics we developed indicate that IRS'
limited number of examiners are unable to cover the universe of
multinational intercorporate transactions.
Thus, given the cbmplexity of the current regulations and IRS' limited resources
with which to implement them, there is a need for revised guidelines which could be more easily administered and which would
bring greater certainty and less burden to section 482 enforcement.

To enforce section 482 under the arm's length standard, IRS
must ex mine in aetai 1 the particulars of intercorporate transactions.
Because of the large number involved, IRS cannot pcssibly
do this for all transactions between corporations and related foreign subsidiaries.
For example, the 519 multinational corporations in our data base generated $32 billion in sales with about
12,000 foreign subsidiaries.
Thus, the first step of IRS' enforcement process is the decision as to which transactions are
to be reviewed in (1et:ail during the examination.
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The LHS nFlnue::l provides sor,;c gu ic'1 Ct? to CXd:'rin r::~ for· ir1en ·
tifying questionable transactions between U.S. corporations and
related foreign corporations which may warrant detailed analysis.
part of this guidance is in a section entitled "Pointers to International Tax Avoidance" which contains several indicat.ors of
the possible existence of non-arm's length dealings.
(See app.
VI.) For exan~le, two of the indicators are:
--Controlled foreign subsidiaries located in tax haven
countries.
A tax haven country is any country whose laws
provide an escape from taxes on incor;:re which would otherwise be taxed in another country.
--Consolidated worldwide profits are higher than U.S.
profits.
This type of situation can be an indication that
profits of the U.S. corporations are being diverted to a
tax haven country.
Information needed for applyin,_' these pointers is obtained
from the multinational corporation's tax return and supporting
books and recoids.
The identificati
of questionable transactions from these pointers is often more difficult than the
equivalent process for many other code sections, because there
is no account or amount shown on the tax return to indicate
whether _section 482 should become an issue.
Therefore, the examiner must resort to the guidelines described above to identify
transactions which may not be in compliance with the arm's length
standard.

Once questionable transactions have been identified, examiners must begin the process of determining if an adjustment is
needed and, if so, the amount_.
Where safe haven rules cannot be
applied, examiners must obtain detailed information concerning
the transactions in question.
To determine whether the intercorporate transactions were priced at arm's length, examiners
must usually perform a functional analysis.
A functional analysis involves a probe into exactly what the pc1rent and its subsidiary actually did in relation to the income ectrnec1.
A functionc1l
analysis is required because IRS believes that facts reg rding
comparctble trC:tnsactions must be ana.lyzec'l to determine with ac
curacy just. what should be measured.
According to IRS' manual, a functionctl analysis is bctsPd on
the economic princ
le that. in a business enteqn·ise, or a group
of enterprises, each function should earn its fctir share of any
resulting profits. When various functions are perforrncrJ, th<:::
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;-•11' ,-in i ·:Q i h.d~ p1·· .vi ·l•!S •:,nsi~ of the c· !fort., dn<'l/oc t:hc r·.ll··-~ or
•:i'li'l<le CtllJ<'t ·iol;~:;, ;1)t)1lld •:r~rn ;.,n•;t of the pr-ofit.
IRS;,,.,;-, .lJ-•::s
the ,-,,L:lt i\IC i.·L•od.,ncc of c ch funci'_ion throucJh functirJn.>l -inal--

ysis.
The lHS n~Hl'Fll requires the cxi1Fliner to obtain suffici1,nt
a to an !3 w f' r q u c s t j on s s u c h a s : 'i'\Th at wa s c1 one ? hTh a t s i '] n i_ f i cant functions were involved in doing it? Who performed each
function, and what was the economic value of each function perfanned by each party?
The manual specifies t.hat normally the
functional analysis begins with t_he organization which initi;lted
the transaction and carries through until the transaction generated income from outside the controlled group.

<1 a t

I

To illustrate, if a parent sells goods to its foreign subsidi<try, it is not enough in most instances to iietermine what
price t.he co1~pora.t. ion paid, the terms of payment, etc.
In addit.ion, the exorniner must determine what the corporation did with
the goods.
For exan~le, if the goods were resold by the foreign
subsidiary, the monual states that the examiner should determine:
a. Whether the corporation had a sales staff.
If so, the
examiner should determine how many and their compensation.
b. Whether it was necessary to provide technical assistance
to the foreign purchaser.
If so, the examiner should
determine who did i t (the foreign corporation or the
parent) and the kind of technical assistance provided.
c. Whether the foreign corporation warehoused the goods or
extended credit to its customers.
If so, the examiner
should determine the amount of capital needed to perform
this function and/or the extent of bad debt experi~nce.
IRS suggests that examiners prepare a checklist to document
the results of the functional analysis.
To prepare the checklist,
examiners must list all the significant functions performed and
then indicate who performed them, the U.S. corporation or the
foreign subsidiary.
(See app. VII for an example of a functional
checklist.)
Once the significant functions and who performed them have
been identified, the functions themselves must be analyzed. This
analysis requires that examiners obtain other information to answer questions such as: Could anyone else perform the functjons?
How difficult are they? What skills are required? What equipment is used? According to IRS, it is critical that examiners
focus on the relative importance of each function in terms of
contribution to the total profit picture.
Thus, a functional
analysis requires data which may take considerable time to obtain and an analysis which will take still more time.
nc~xt

Once an ex<rniner has conpleted a functional analysis, the
step is to search for a comparable uncontrolled price.
The
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I [:: . 5 rr.-, n u a l r e qui_ res t h c e x et rd rL_:: r to b c 'J in by i n v c: ~' t j 'J,, t in] t h c
validity of the method used by the cor.-poraLior. in ar.-rivintj at the
price it used.
For example, if the commission charged to a foreign corporation was based on commissions charged to independent
parties, the independent transactions should be examined to detc r.ninc if the cornmi ss ion can be used as a conn a ra':J le. w"hen a
compardble price cannot be found from within the corporation's
own controlled group the examiner must look to third party data.
This step would require obtaining appropriate information from
government sources, industrial organizations, investment services,
and the private business sector.
Regardless of where comparables are obtained, the examinee
must develop sufficient information concerning them to show that
the transactions used are in fact comparable.
This requires details concerning the terms at which the comparable transactions
were handled and the circumstances surrounding the transactions,
including a comparison between (l) functions performed by each
party involved in the comparable transaction and (2) functions
performed by the parent and foreign ubsidiary in the questioned
transaction.
IRS considers third party transactions comparable to the
controlled transactions if the property and circumstances in the
uncontrolled transactions are identical to those in the controlled
transaction; or if they are so nearly identical that they have no
effect on price or can be reflected by a reasonable number of adjustments to the uncontrolled sales.
IRS also instructs its examiners that in some cases a single "best" com[larable may not be
found.
Instead, there may be several independent transactions
each of which differs from the questionable transaction in some
significant way . However, considered together, the several independent transactions may be used to determine an arm's length
price for the questionable transaction within a usable narrow
range.
The IRS examination reports we reviewed provided some insight into the difficult and time-consuming work involved in
performing a functional analysis and in analyzing arm's length
transactions to determine adjustment amounts.
The key aspects
of a functional analysis and the development of a transfer price
by an IRS economist can be illustrated by the follmving exr::nnple.
ration A, a U.S. parent, bought electronic item~ from
ore gn subsidiary. The IRS economist, as part of the
functional analysis, researched the manufacturing process
for the electronic products and found that it consisted of
(l) silicon manufacturing which involved processin<J of high
purity silicon into slice fon.-,, (2) front end manufacturing
which involved processin<J the slices to active elern;:'nts with
e l e c t ron i c fun c t ions b u i l t i n , a n d ( 3 ) a s s c:: mb l i n g a n rJ t e s ting which invo 1 ved as scL:'n l i tHJ b;c., r s or chip::; in to pet(~kr' 9e ::J
-,-------'"---:::- --
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/\(('i_,~.·,Ji.ncj
<J tl1e •:r:r)rJ<J,.ti.•;t's :t:t'·i>urt,
!11·~ Li r •.;t_ 1.::0 hit;h -t<:c1Jrl<Jl•)(JY prlrLs \:/C'L-C f)(Tfonn.~d by the
1J. ~ 1 . p , u n 1- •
r i \'<' ,, s i n t 1v~ ;, ~:; c: 1; 1b 1 i n q '' n d h.: s t i lVJ t h a t t h e
f"<.rei<.Ji1 ~;uh:;idi.lJY
ni.:n:-d the mrtnufilcturing process.
'l'he

.. , .d

t

·,1

t ,.;, ·ll

functions performed by t_he foreign subsidiary inclu.ded
--scribing the complete silicon slice,
--breaking the sliCe into chips,
--assembling good chips into finished devices with
heac1ers, 1 c~.1d fra.1nes, bonding material, lead wires,
mol rling C<!lnponents and,
--testing finished devices and packaging.
On the basis of information developed through this analysis
of the m<lnufC~cturing process, the economist concluded that
the foreign subsidiary should have been compensated for only
assembly and test services.
The economist then developed
transfer prices for electronic items based on an analysis
of what would be an L:lppropriate amount (labor costs plus
profit) to reimburse t.he foreign subsidiary for assembling
and testing the items for the U.S. parent.
The economist
interviewed 10 independent contract assemblers (with facilities in foreign countries) to determine (1) the trade
practices which prevailed when these cont_ractors dealt
with U.S. companies, and (2) the net profit margin which
these contractors earned.
The economist decided that the
independent contract assemblers were functionally compar~ble to the foreign subsidiary's operation and that the ·
independent net profit margins ranged from near zero to
over 20 percent.
Factors affecting the profit margins included the market conditions and the mix of simple and complex devices.
One independent contract assembler provided
the economist with its gross profit margin for 1 year for
six major product categories and its income statement data.
T1le C'Conornist converted the gross margin on sales percentages to net margin on cost percentages which then became the
comparable profit rates used to compute the section 482 adjustment.
Some ad

may not be made
e enfo1:ce:re-nt·----- --ve

ust~ents

In talking with examiners in the seven IRS districts we visitPd, we learned that they believe that some potential section
~~~i:2 ,J.<Jj;_)~: ments are not being r'level Oi;.;ecL
Exar:.ir:ers in three distric:ts attributed this sii~uation to bot-h the difficulties in the
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._:o:i.tC)t'cc:·:ct·:nt procc~;s and the; tirtl(~ it t.'l}-:,:·,~; t.o dn the w::n~}:..
'l"hey ste1ted that some examiners give higher priocity to oUt·.r
international tax issues, such as foreign tax credits, because
it is less difficult and less time-consuming to identify the addition::tl tax.
They added that section 482 work is a "high risk
vent.ure" where much audit work can result in little additional
tax.
They pointed out that because of this, sonv:: ex::1mincrs hes-·
itate to "go out on a limb" in attempting to deve:•lop an adju~3t
ment and focus only on cases of flagrant abuse.
The examiners
indicated that a section 482 adjustment might not be attempted
because of the difficulty involved in reaching agreement on an
arm's length price or on the basis for making the adjustment.
IRS was unable to provide us with data on the average
length of time required to identify and develop a section 482
adjustment. One reason for this is that examiners work other
international tax issues at the same time they are developing
section 482 adjustments and sometimes work on several examinations simultaneously. Examiners also pointed out that the time
needed to develop an adjustment can v~-y greatly depending on
the type of adjustment being developed, the pricing method which
must be used, and the cooperation of co.porate officials.
A few examiners explained why the enforcement process takes
so long. The primary reasons, according to the examiners, are
that it tak~s time to study the corporation and/or its industry
to become sufficiently knowledgeable to perform a functional
analysis and to analyze comparable transactions, and that i t
takes time to obtain the substantial data and records that are
needed from the corporation and other sources.
These examiners
also told us some of their experiences which can provide some
insight into why the enforcement process is lengthy.
--Two examiners stated that to make an adjustment an ex miner should (l) review the taxpayer's return including
pertinent schedules, (2) review form 2952 for intercorporate pricing, ( 3) review prior IRS reports for section
482 adjustments (4) visit the library to study activities
of the corporation through news articles, shareholder reports, etc., and (5) analyze the corporations' ability
to make money by comparing profits to assets, payroll,
sales, etc.
---One exarainer said that if the corpora.tion is not cooperative or does not have an adequ2te rccordkceping system,
it could take over l year for the examiner to obtain sufficient info~mation to determine whether an adjustment
should be made.
--Another examiner said that obtaining a.cccss to corporate
record~; to develop ac1justwents is a difficult ta~.;k.
He
explained that questions on internation::l tax issues arc:
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i I~S r:x<t'''i !H•rs }v,ve a 1 so st-_;:.t.ed that they are unable to cover
t1•e universe of potential adjustments.
During interviews in 1977
with Bnuse Co,,•ni tt_ee on ';.<Jays and !•1eans Oversight Subcommi t.tr:;e
staff, IRS examiners said that when they are faced with numerous
records of tran::;actions, they generally rely on either a sconning
of the records or the examination of a few of the largest <iollar
transactions over a 1- or 2-month period.
It is obvious that
with such techniques only a few transactions can be examined and
that if transactions are not examined, potential adjustments cannot be identified.

Our statistics can be interpreted to lend credence to the
coinmc>nts.
For example:

ex;1m:i.n.~rs'

--Only 200 of the 519 multinational corporations in our
data base had section 482 adjustments involving their
foreign subsidiaries.
--The total profit (before taxes) of the corporations examined was $43,513.8 million.
However, the adjustments
amounted to only $277.5 million, a relatively small impact
on corporate profit.
The adjustments increased the profit
of U.S. parents by 0.9 percent ($277.5 of $31,798.0 million) and reduced the profit of foreign subsidiaries by
2.4 percent ($277.5 of $11,715.8 million).
--The bulk of the total $277.5 million was concentrated in
only a few of the 403 total adjustments.
Eleven of the
403 adjustments accounted for over one-half of the $277.5
million.
--Adjustments involving the sale of tangible property, the
category of intercorporate transaction where the largest
amounts of revenue are at issue, were also concentrated.
~hirty-five u.s. parents and 89 of their foreign subsidiaries experienced adjustments on tangible property sales
of $4.4 billion.
The other 12,248 foreign subsidiaries
of the 519 U.S. parents experienced no adjustments to a
total of $28.1 billion in intercorporate sa1es transactions.
Neither we nor IRS know how much noncompliance exists, nor
how many more adjustments IRS should have made.
Hov:ever, given
the difficulty inherent in administering sectisn 482 through the
current Treasury r<::gulat.ions, the ex,::::ni:,c:rs' st:1terc-:ents, and the
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The difficulty in making section 482 adjustments and the impact this difficulty has on enforcement was recognized as early
as 1962 in a House report. 1/ The report stated that, in practice, the difficulty in determining a fair price un~er this code
provision severely limits the usefulness of its power, especially
when there are thousands of different transactions between a domestic corporation and its foreign subsidiaries.
A recent report documents the fact that section 482 adjustments continue to be a problem for all concerned.
The
study, dated January 12, 1981 and written by Richard Gordon,
Special Counselor, International Taxation, was undertaken in
response to a joint request by the Acting Commissioner of IRS,
the Assistant Attorney Genera , and the Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury for Tax Policy, and in response to congressional
pressure upon IRS to take significant action against tax haven
abuses. 2/ The study concluded that se~tion 482 is one of the
most important tools available to IRS ~or dealing with tax haven tax haven transactions but found that both IRS and taxpayers
have had difficulties with the current section 482 regulations.
The study recommended that the regulations be amended so as to
ease some of the administrative burden placed on both taxpayers
and the IRS and to achieve greater certainty in pricing international transactions.
CORPORATIONS, COURTS, TAX EXPERTS
AND IRS OFFICIALS HAVE CRITI IZEO
Tt-fF: --sECT ION 482--l::fEGULATfo~
Representat'ives of all groups affect.ec1 by an<'l knowledr]'::~at)le
about section 482 enforcement under the arm's length standard
have voiced continuous and substantive criticisr11 of the regu-·
lations.
The criticisms focus on the fact that section 482
enforcement creates a large administrative burden and that the
end result of a section 482 enforcement action is too often
unpredictable and subjective.

1/U.S. Congress, House, Allocation of Incorrc~ Betwe-;n Relnted
- Foreign and Domestic Organ zat ons, 87th Congre~:;s., 2nd sess.,
Ho~E~e--Rept. 144-;T(l962T.-- ---- ---2/Richard A. Gordon, Tax Havens and Th ir Use_by
T2~~pil)"CLE.; ---·~.rr o_':C£\IJ
T~J?!
tor1_:_
19 nYT~
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l\ l ~}}/_ : . 1 \l(1y 1)y f J·~(~ ("t_)Jlf(-'1-r'.'J!CC: ~-~J),-:,1 \1 d(-)('~lJl'l,··;,f (-:d 1 he~ \/] 1 ··\.'S
·,), 1,,,-,l:,, c,Jfi,·io~ls. 1/
Tlt•'ir ;n·ilt< i1•·1l c,)Jjl··c:l ir>~l:; \r) 1:-~:::;·
:c·<
ic.Jl .]d/. ,.,,j",,(<'l'il•'lli' <,•c<; 1 11;;t (1) I)H; .-,,J,Jl.ytie2l ·'l'l··r·r·,,,·h
to :,:tc:Citi•Jinq dl!n's 1:•tlC)Lh ~)1:i1·c;s oft,~n l;:ac1s to ~lnt·ea:><>:J<Jf)]e
r-•·:~i'Jlts ;1nd (2) the cx.·nninat.ions require extensive cocporatc

c)[

<'Xj)<'rF;e and lahur.
The follO'wing are sor:1e specific cri.tieisr:1s
of corpordt.e offici :'lls as '~ocumentc('1 in the Conference Board
report.

Sor.le of fie i als believed the fundamental concept of .1.rm' s
lensth dc;al ing betvJeen related corpor<:1tions is unrealistic.
In a ·.,;orld of compei:ition arnong multinational firms,
they ,, sk -,,hy the parent corporat) on shou 1 d not favor its
S'lbs i <J i.-lJ i ·~·s over unn f f i 1 i <> i'~ed corporations.
The s tJb,; i r1 iaric~s ar1.3 ('>:pr.::cted to pi1y divic1enc1s while the 'HF1ffi1L1t.C'd
<:orpor a 1· ions <J re not.
SOH;r~ offi cia 1 s dc~scr:i bed the CX<Jr.tiner' s detenninati on of
an dr,n's lenqth price <'is "arbitrary."
Sorne corporC>te tax
cxt:cul Lves stat.,d that they did not know how the C'Xillili nr:r
<JOt the fiqurc proposed, and the examiner either could
not. or would not <?xplain its derivation.
In some of thc~~::;e
cases, 1 he corpora t_ ion ;l ccept ed the figure heca use the
proposc'd <:idjuslJnent was small.

--Some officials drew attention to the expense and labor
involved in international examinations.
The officials
objected to ~1at they considered an unnecessary load of
paperwork.
For example, the tax mar1ager of one company
declined to guess the cost of satisfying IRS examiners
that international transactions do not violate section
482 regulations, although he believed the costs to be
consi0crable.
11e said that he did not object because he
considers the defense against IRS allocations a necessary
function of his tax department.
He did state, however,
that the examiners raise many questions that take time
and trouble to answer without being closely related to
the examination.

A J980 study report 2/ indicates that the concerns of corporate officials as inclu~ed in the 1972 Conference Board Report
are still concerns today.
The study showed that arm's length
prices have not been successfully applied to the extent anticipated by IRS when the regulations '.vere ·:ipproved.
The s t.udy
staLed that, while the arm's length standard is based on the
_!_/Duerr, .?P. cit.
~/Burns,

o.r..

cit.
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thctl a Stl1)-,1rli;clr-y is lt>(_J-;lly an'l c,·,,cv,,t\.lly :;·;·
,•,.
fron. its parent corpor-ation, only 41 pet·c,~nt of thi· cocp ,,-dtion:;
indicated that their organizations actually operate in this manner.
In addition, the study showed that while the corporations
wer com2osed of nu~erous legalLy separate entities, 4~ percent
stated that they malze rctost intf:rcorapCJny pricing dc.>c1 sions as
though the organization was one economic unit.
The stu~y con
eluded that this difference in philosophy between the arnt' s
length standard and multinational corporations is basic to the
section 482 controversy.
The 1980 study also concluded that (1)
considerable uncertainty surrounds the implem.::·ntation of section
482 through the regulations, and (2) section 482 adjustments are
very costly.
Although most corporate officials indicated in both
studies that they accepted the artn's length premise, they expressed concern that the regulations were vague and confusing.
p::e ,i

sc~vera

court decisions have also poj ntec1 ou L t.he admi nistrative difficulty in section 4R2 ac'ljustmcnts.
Specifically, a
Court of Claims judge's decision in a 1978 case involving E. I.
Du Pont De Nemours and Company sta ed the following:
l

"As evidenced by the magnitude of the record compiled in
this case, the resolution by tr:al of a reallocation controversy under section 482 can be a very burdensome, time~onsuming and obviously expensive process--especially if
the stakes are high.
A more manageable and expeditious
means of resolution should be found.
The evidence adduced in this case through Dr. Irving Plotkin, a skilled
practitioner of the discipline of econometrics, strongly
suggests that the promulgation of universally applicable
safehaven criteria to facilitate the administration of
section 482 may now be both entirely feasible and eminently pr9per." }:./
Another regulation problem--uncertain
SLirfaced as a result of an Appeals Court decision in 1980 to revcr.-se an earlier
Tax Court ruling in a case involving the U.S. Steel Corporation.
The Appeals Court accepted a price from a transaction which IRS
and the Tax Court deemed not comparable because there were significant differences in the circumstances of the intercorporate
transaction and the transacti_on used as a comparahle.
The decision stated the following:
"In v e. c y f e ,;.~ indus t r i e ::; a r e trans a t ion::; t r u 1 y cor<;: 1 c-,
able in the strict sense used by Judge Qu aly.
Every
transaction in wheat, for exi'lmple, is more or les:> thr~
se>,ne, except for stctnc'lard V0ri0tions in amcJLwl, tirae of:

1/
I. Du Pont De
-(Ct. Cls. 197')).

Ne1:1.:~mr
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o_;et. of ..cxrwctat~ions .1bout ,1urat_inn
t;L,:•col ;1not:.her, ;11ay be to recognize

and risk, and [lJ.S.]
economic rr'alit:y;
but it is also to engraft a crippling degree of economic sophisi.i.crJ.t.ion onto a badly dr::rv~n st.:ti:utc \vhich-i f ' co rnp arab l e ' i s t a k en t o me an ' i dent i c a 1, ' a s J u r1 g e
Q\ll::a ly would .c cad i t----'>vou ld allow the tilxpayer no
safe harbor from t.he Commissioner's virtually unrestricted discretion to reallocate." l_/

One tax expert, in coDmenting on the jur1icial history of
section 482, sair1 that when readily con~arable transactions
have bh?n avai1;Jb1e the Jecisions by the courts have been ratJ1er
st.raiCjht.forw-'lrd.
llo·,.;cver, when readily comparable t.ransi'ictions
were not obtainer1 the courts have had much greater r1ifficulty in
reaching a judgment.
In such cases, the courts have genera1.ly
recpiired the corporation to show that its i ntercorpora t.e transaction prices are correct rather than showing that IRS' allocation is erroneous.
IRS representatives have also expressed concerns about the
subjectivity of section 482 adjustments.
For example, they told
us that.:
--An examiner develops a price after studying all available
data.
However, the examiner has no assurance that the
price developed is an arm's length price.
The concept of
an arm's length price is great in theory but in practice
the price established is judgmental.
--An ex21miner finds i t very difficult to obtain comparable
uncontrolled prices.
Approval from the third party is
needed if a disclosure of the information is to be made.
Generally third parties are reluctant to grant disclosure
permission because of market competitiveness and the secrecy surrounding corporate activity.
t1uch of the criticism of section 482 enforcement, re<;ardless of the source, seems to center on the incompatability between the nature of multicorporate business activities and the
arm's length standard.
The nat.ure of modern mul ticorporate business activities makes it difficult for IRS examiners to locate
cor;-,parable uncontrolled prices on -which to base adjustments.

l/U.S.

~;1

c'el Corpc)rat.ion v. Corrlfnissioner of Internal Revenue,

--- F • 2 d 9 4 2 ( 2 n d C i r . 1 9 8 0 ) •
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For example, the 1972 Conf<:?ren e BCld!d repnr-t and other
studies by tax experts gave several reasons v:hy the cornpiirabl e
uncontrolled price method is seldom used in developing tangible
property adjustments.
These studies point out that many products,
such as components and sernifinished goods, are sold only to controlled subsidiaries because multinationals are often structured
as an integrated production process.
For such transactions, no
open market equivalent exists.
Other products, such as finished
goods and raw materials, may be sold to both controlled and uncontrolled buyers, but the transactions may not be comparable
because (1} different customers have different amounts of bargaining power, (2) custorners have different objectives and are
governed by different laws and regulations; and (3) customers
receive different amounts and kinds of service.
In addition, the Conference Board report points out that the
concept of a comparable uncontrolled price does not always correspond to intercorporate pricing pr tice.
Only a few corporations base their intercorporate price on comparable uncontrolled
transactions.
From questionnaires sul ,itted by 512 corporations
and 90 personal interviews, Conference Board researchers learned
that corporate officials base prices for intercorporate transactions on long-range plans, not on prices for comparable uncontrolled transactions.
Corporate officials more often ask the
question "What are we earning this year and what will we earn
5 years from now?" rather than ''What is the correct markup percentage on this component?"
In addition to long-range planning considerations, other
factors may influence intercorporate prices.
For example, a parent corporation may engage in a transaction with its foreign subs
iary at a low price in order to give the subs diary a
tive advantage in the foreign market.
Intercorporate pricing
pract ces may also differ from uncontrolled transactions because
a subsidiary is expected to pay dividenrls where an unrelated corporation is not.
It is argued, moreover, that intercorporate
prices are often not a matter of public knowledge and that even
if a corporation wanted to base a transfer price on a comparable
transaction, the corporation might have difficulty finding the
necessary information.
F
lly, some experts on section 482 enforcement argue that
treating intercorporate transactions as separate taxable events
conducted at arm's length can result in the creation of false
profits or losses.
They base this argument on the preillise that a
gain or loss cannot actually be realized until a transaction is
made between a member of the controlled group and an independent
party.
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r n 1 ') 11 I R s s t. a 1- i s t i c s c on f i r: ,lC: d that t h c r e i s o ftc n a l a c k
of ,:or.·.plc.::~ble uncontrolled trZ'Insactions on v;hjch to hnse CJ.rm's
lc··;Jijth prices for s.;ctinn 482 a<'ljustments.
In conn,?ction vJi·th
th se statistics, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Trr>asury,
in a June 1971 rH~moronrJum, made the following com;ncnts:

•

"We t'hink it is time to concede that in the absence of
comparable t.h i ro party transactions pJ ainly ana] ogous
to the transaction being cxamineo, the most we can
1l•)pe for is tl1e :1:=:.~-;ur;1ncc of a reasonahle return to
111c fJ. S. L1XfFJyer for its cost and effort in produciiVJ or market.ing the proouct, as t.he case may be.
In
c;;se s where such t.hird·-p·"'irty comparahles are not readily available, a precisely correct determination of the
hy_?oth,~tical arm's length price is impossible.
Under
the best of ci1:cumstances the answer finally settled
upon cCJ.n only he a rough and unproven estimate of what
would have been the terms of the transaction if the
parties had not been relat.erl."
During 1971 Treasury and IRS considered, but did not ir~le
ment, several regulation changes involving the sale of tangible
property transactions.
The changes were consirlered to make section 482 enforcement using the arm's length st_andard less flifficult anfl ;nore fair.
l'"ccording to t.he Deputy Assistant Secretary,
consifleration of the changes was needed because of the persistent
criticism of the regulations by corporate officials, professional
groups, corporate associations, and trends in court cases.
The
propos(:!d cho ngcs were c i rcu 1 a ted to Treasury, IRS, and the Department of Justice for co~nent but no action was taken.
The
proposed changes included:
--Reducing uncertainties encountered by multinational corporations in determining whether an intercorporate transaction would be subject to an adjustment by revising the
regulations to extend the use of safe haven pricing.
--Revis1ng the priorities given to various methods of deterDining an arm's length price. Specifically, only prices
actually oht.;:;ined from col1lparable uncontrolled trelnsactions involvi g the corporation in question would be given
priority.
The search for an arm's length price would thus
be limited to within the corporation.
--Specifying in the regu 1 at ions how the ex.>mi ner should a rr i v e .-, t 0. n " n n ' s 1 c rv_; t h p r i c e 'v·ih c: n u s i n g t h e f o 11 r t h ( "'' n y
ot hr:r")
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l'1.. 1978 Clc,si_ng ffi>?l~:()'C~\n 1tl~1 nr-,f-r?.1 t(JCtt-~ s:"··,./
rec2ivcd Otl t11e prcJpC)SCC1 C1lilt19CE> ir1r1ic~d.tec1 t'rt

((")l of t,rl(~ ('(', ' : l ~~·~t·s
lctrgc f)tl::)inc:.J~:_;c·~;

t

~ould benefit while small businesses would be adversely aEfecteJ.
other corrunents indicated an overall satisfaction with the existing regulations.
IRS' EconotTlic Advisory Group commenter1 that the
9ror·osc:'d changes would condone the non-ann's len<Jth pricing of
intc:- r-curporate transactions and significantly reduce the rE"-~t-_'nUE'
IRS achieves from section 482 enforcement.
Apparently for these
reasons, no further action was taken.

TREASURY SHOULD STUDY THE
-IBILI'l'Y OF IrvlPROVING THE
REGULl\T IOt\JS
-------------~----

The regulation changes considered by Treasury and IRS were
drafted in 1971.
Since then, experts in the field of section 482
enforcement, independent studies such as the 1972 Conference Board
Study, court opinions, and corporate officiAls hc:\ve continuec'l to
express substantive criticisms of the uncertainty an(1 adm nislrative burden created by the section 49~ regulations.
The validity of the arm's length premise has been questioned and specific
changes to the regulations have been s 0gested.
We believe the problems experienced in implementing the
section 482 regulations are sufficiently serious to be addressed.
To do this, Treasury should, as a first step, undertake a study
to evaluate the feasibility of the suggested changes to section
482 as well as to identify additional ways to allocate income.

Some of fie ia 1 s have suggested chan<Jes to the r egu1 at ionc'>
which would provide greater certainty before an IRS examination an•J would thus allow them to b<~tter plan their fin;1nc·ia1
strategy.
The suggestion offered most frequently by corporz;_te
officia1s was that Treasury identify some rnc~;c,ns of est2,t)lishing
a rang~:-, of prices within which U.S. corporations could operate
without fear of later adjustments.
Some executjves have suggested that safe haven ranges be worked out on an industry or
proch: t-line basis.
Others have suggC>st_c;\1 that sorY::: division of
pro f
h::: tv.: e c,; n the U • S . corp or ct t i o n a n d i t =-~ f o r e i g n subs i c1 i a r i e s
be set as a reasonable yardstick.
In either case, the off cials
beli v 1 the safe haven range would elimjnate the uncertainty
cone rnin') th'' pricing of intercorporate transactions and reduce
•Cc~<luctive administra.tive cc1
s to bot-_h thr: C(1rpor<ttiono:; ancl
IRS.
Uncl•:rlying the com•ncnt:c; of nvtny officiiils wl1o f<tvoc,·cl <t

s

fr:: h,v..:;n r~itl'JC for pcicin•J is the COfl'Ji('l icJ
t.·h tl ~;\lc·1~ il rc~r,::J•',
djf[icult to est~et'nlir;h, would b• ilrl irlil)r-1)'/ 1 :.1•·;,[ (J'/•_t lfi''
sy tcm of d.:::Len,drdny arm's lcnc L1t pric•·';.
Thr: CXL'·lrtl··cl

hur:\:--:_•r
presf.:r,t
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justified.

Tax c::xpcrts,

in articles based on court cases, st.uc1ies, .1ncl
of .inforrnc:ttion, have also stated that reguldtion
c:h.1ngcs .:ctre neer1ed.
'rheir suggest.ions have generally revolved
around the use of safe havens and profit spJits as acceptable
,.,,~thocis to use in rlctcr;rdnirHJ S~'Ction 482 inccllne .1llocatinns.
For cx;1ntp1c, curpoc~1t.e o[fic~i,1ls ~3u<JrJc~sted in i:h(:! 3urns s1-_ur1y
t 1Jat Tr-c snry ('Xp<>r <1 the use of s:>fe 'haven rul ~~s, est.abl ish ac-('Pptahle profit. ~;pliis or i1. rninLnurn pc~rcenLi<Je of the profit to
he inr::lu(1er1 in u.s. incor:l(', ano arlopt fornmlas such as those
·iVai],-Jble to Dor:-v~stic Int0rnational Sales Corporations (DISCs)
for c a 1 c u l ,j t. i n <J t. r a n ~; [ c' r p r· i c r: s •
t)t·1lt~.C

CJllrc~cs

Tn connect i.on vd t.h the i1l1ove cu:nrn,~nts, IRS h.:1s estahLi shed
i;;,cd pricin<J nni ts [or a few co:nmodities (see p. 6}.
Th se unj ts <:ont.rol the price t.hat must be used by internatinnal exa1niners in making section 482 adjustments.
The price
established by the pricing units is known by both corporate officials and IRS examiners.
According to IRS, the pricing units
were established to better use limited resources and to provide
for uniform and consistent treatment of common issues among corporate taxpayers.

{~(·ntr:aJ

C·ible,
----ndard
Other experts and studies have questioned the validity of
the premise underlying the arm's length standard that a parent
corporation and its subsidiary are in all instances operating
;:; s two separate corporations. 'i'hes e experts and studies have
.'Jrgue\1 th;'lt wh>~n a nulti.national p;;,rent's operations are suffic
ntly integrated with its foreign subsidiaries, formula apportionment, as used by the States, is a more appropriate method
to use in allocating the income. In these situations, they bcli
e the arm's length standard is fundamentally flawRd because
it is not consistent 'N'ith the economic reality of the operations
of the related corporate group.
In contrast t.o the arm's length standard, formu 1 a apportionunder the unitary method views controlled corporations which
C r"1ur~t int0>gratc~d bu:;lr~c:ooS
per0tions c'lS a Si!1<Jle unit or 1J•lsi;;z';S (or r:'lx pnl·pc)c;r's.
Tl-re pr.::J ise is that tlv::se controlled
c rp•J atinns ;1re conr·,JirJ:dcd by a central ::'.ana']em,3nt policy and
men
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:1

':1:'

izati0n1l struclllC·_·, v:hich s,-~,-~1:: t o w , ,

iY.•'

or . Jiir:c:.

11

1';

thc1t since all of the contru1le-1 ccnrJuC•lli~lr.'; w::ich iJ.Yc;
involved in the integra ted operations are cons i(ie rc,1 to be part
of the same unitary business, intercorporate transactions cannot
produce a real economic gain or loss.
Thus, profit or loss is
det.en::i ned solely by trans0ctions l.vith unrelale(1 bu';ines:;es, the
s:u:'-.; as for a "truly" independent corpocatioc.
ar-guc,1

Under formula apportionment, a formula is used to apportion
the income between the commonly controlled corporations.
The
forrt;ula represents the relationship of the in,'lividua l corporation's activities to the total activities for the CO'llrolled
group.
The factors most discusse~ for use in the formula arc
the ones used by the States to tax multistate and multinational
manufacturing and mercantile corporations. All 45 States which
tax corporate income use some combination of propE!rty, payroll,
and sales as formula factors.
The apportioning of the income by
such a for•nula is raerely a device for the division of the incor•v::
earned.
The formula does not impos any tax on the income.
Formula apportionment might elimt ate
SOrTie probleras. associated with___us.f'ng___
5-Te--th--starviarCi___________ -----

t11ea-rrn ·

Advocates of formula apportionment indicate that thi c;
method is not only more appropriate to use in situations involving integrated operations among controlled corporations but could
actually eliminate some of the problems associated with using the
arm's length standard.
Advocates claim that this has been demonstrated by the States, particularly California.
They explain that the States use formula apportionment primarily because of (l) the extensive potential for tax avoida e
through non-arrn' s l eng Lh t rans.'lct ions be tv:ec:n con trolled. co rpocations, (2) the neen to substantially incr ase the numb r of their
auditors to adclress this potentia] throu
tht: arm's length st2,ndard, and (3) the belief that enforcement through the arm's length
standard is not working well at the Federal level.
They also
point out that formula apportionment eliminates the arm's length
assumptions that
--an arm's length market price can always he established;
- -- g en c· r a 1 o v e rhea d an rl a,] m L n i s t rat i v e e x L' c~ n s e s c 21 n lh' fa i r 1 y
allocat_ed arrong the cor•\!Ponly controlle3 corporat.ions in
valved in the integrated operations; and that
- - i t i s p o s s i b 1 e to d e t e r m i n e the p rope r cUIVJ u n t o f p r o f i t
a l 1 o c a t i o n t o d i f f r· e n t f u tt t i o n s <; u c h a s rn. H1 1 1 f; 1 r:: t u r- i n c;

anc1 selling.
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Critics of formula apportionment raise several abjections to
its use.
The rnoce important criticisrns include (1) t_he diffic u 1 t y i_ n d c: f i n i n g t h o s e con t r o ll e d co 1~ pur 0. t i on s ·w h i c h s hen 1 d be
incl1J<'l1~d in the~ <lnitary bu~;in•,Gs operations of the ~:lUlt_jn:ii ion;1l
t'•)l llor;Ji· ions;
( 2) the 1 ack of comparc"lbi 1 ii·.y of tl1e fdct.ors \J~;ed
in 1hc fol!IH11.1. ft•Jm one country t.o another; (3) the administrative b1n·t1r:n Js:-:;oc"iated with ob-taining the data n·~eaed to use for':mla apportionment; and, (4) the fact that the arm's len(Jth siand'ctrd has world..vioe acceptance.
Advocates acknowledge that the t'1bove criticisms of formula
apport ionrnen t have va lini ty.
However, they also believe t.ha t
these problems have solut.ions.
For example, they recognize that
a corporation would not know in advance of an IRS examination
whether or not it would be consjdered unitary unless the definition of unitary is uniformly applied and administered.
'1owever,
they also cite one State which uses formula apportionment under
the unitary concept as having initiated an advance ruling program
to eliminate this problem.
The advocates also acknowledge that there may be some distortion in the factors used in the formula from one country to
another.
However, t.hey believe that i t is possible to elimjnate
the distort1on in the factors--to a great extent--through the
use of comparability tables.
Concerning the administrative burden, the advocates indicate that some U.S. multinational corporat.ions now prepare sophisticated financial analyses for U.S.
purposes and that this information could be used in applying the
apportionment formulas.
As such, formula apportionment should
not place any greater burden on the administrative resources of
the corporations than the arm's length standard.
They also believe that formula apportionment would place much less of a burden on IRS' resources than does section 482 enforcement under the
arm's length standard.
They indicate that this is one of the
r,:;'l;-:;Dns why the StatPs have ac'lopted this methorl.
COL\lCLUSIONS

Making income adjustments using the arm's length standard
has posed ~~ministrative burdens on both IRS and corporate taxP"Y'"r:,;.
n,,r· 11se of the structure of t"he ;.,or}el-n bt1si:'l.,ss ·..vorld,
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justm<C,nts but must insteud construct a price.
A~-; u rc':;ult., cor·porate taxpayers cannot be certain how income on intercorporate
transactio_ns that cross national borders will be adjusted and
the enforcei,\ent process is difficult and time-consuning for both
IRS ~nd taxp2yers.
Parties affected by and knowledgeuble about arm's length
adjustments--officials at IRS and Treasury, corporate taxpayers,
courts, and experts in the field--have voiced substantive and ongoing criticisms of the section 482 regulations.
Treasury's decision in the early 1970s to consider several regul~tion changes
indicates that it recognized the validity of the criticis~ at
that time.
Given the continued flow of critic~sm since then and
the continued growth in the number and complexity of intercorporate transactions as compared to IRS' limited resources, i t seems
to us that the need is even gre ter now than it was a decade ago
for Treasury to consider revisi g the regulations.
Experts have suggested that chcL'ging the regulations to
expand the use of the safe haven conc~pt would bring greater certainty to the enforcement process.
Other experts have suggested
that using the formula apportionment method, when appropriate,
would eliminate the need to search for an arm's length price,
reduce administrative burden, and make section 482 enforcement
more certain.
The States, whose examination resources are even
more limited than IRS', use formula apportionment for these
reasons.
A major objection to the usc of formula apportionment across
national borders is that tax treaties between the U.S. and other
nations specify the arm's length standard for adjusting corporate
income.
For the U.S. to adopt a different method could result in
multinational corporations incurring double taxation.
We r cogn i z e the s i g n i f i can c e o f t h i s p cob l e ·n • How c~ v e r , w c a 1 s o be 1 i e v E::
that as a world lerJder anc1 internation.tl policy-sett.er, the U.S.
should not be hesitant to take the lea~ in searching for better
ways to administer the tax consequences of intercorporate transactions that cross national boundaries.
In this regard, Treasury should be the focal point for a
stucJy to identify wuys to improve section 432 enforcement.
The
need for such a study will beccnilC: evc:n more u rg<:.'n t if IRS' meas-ure shows extensive noncon:[>LLanc<c;.
Aft r Treas ry has cor;•pletecJ
this study, i t should be able to make an informed decision as to
whether and how i t should ch2nge th section 482 reg:_llations.
ENDATION
TO THE SECRETARY
--
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\vh1 le LRS .:nd TLQZl.sury recognizsd t};at s.:"ct.ion 482 <:nforceproc:•dures pr sent probJ ems, both agencies expressed rlis<<gr<:un(;nt v;i th c.ur r ccH:Jii•'lldation that Treas ry undertake a study
of the regulati.uns.
In so doing, both agencies, we believe,
Ii1'inind ?,ed the seriousness of the difficulties which section 482
n [orccJnent h0s pi~esented and continues to present o.ll affectc:d
F'<LtiPs.
As we noted in our report, uncert~ainty as ·.vell as the
,,.<,ninist~rat.ive difficulties <Hid burden on all part.ies aff<'~.:tcd
by :;t-:ct.ion 482 enfor:cc:Hl•~nt l1ave been documcnLed in all pr vicus
sludj;;s on the subject, the Ji!OSt recent being a January 1981
sLudy undertaktc.n at the joint request of the Acting Corrunissionc;r
of lRS, the Assistant Attorney General, and the Assistant S~cretary
of the Treasury for Tax Policy.

;;;r:nt~

In addition, both Treasury and IRS expressed serious reserV<;Li ns about our statistics and seemed to think thctt they preG(:rlt.r~d a Htisl(~ading pi ct:ure of section 482 enforcement.
Goth
agone i c s sP-cJ;H~d to believe we understated the extent of pre:>r::nt
:;<::ct ion 482 en forc01nent and overstated the adm istrati ve di fficult.:ies.
We incorporated into the report more specific recognition that IRS
e some section 482 adjustments which we excluded from our sample.
We also clarified the explanation of
our scope and our rationale for excluding certain adjustments.
We believe our statistics accurately reflect the pertinent data
available and, together with the other evidence presented in the
rc~ort, convincingly show that the problems inherent in enforcing
sect o
482 are substantial.

IRS s emed to interpret our report as recommending that
sury r consider the fundamental principle of the arm's
1 ngt:.h sta <lard.
In this regard IRS pointed out that Treasury
was in the process of r
sing the regulations and stated that,
specifically, Treasury was studying ways to amend the regulations relating to a safe haven rule for the sale of tangible
property and would publish proposed regulation ch2nges shortly .
.fRS
hought that Treasury's approach of revising parts of the
re~ula1:ions ~as better than such wholesale reworking of the
resulations as IRS understood us to have reco~nended.
In addition, IRS did not think that it had enough experience to participate in a reconsideration of the arm's length standard.
T

~
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intent that Treasury would take whatever course is indicated
by the study results.
Moreover, we believe that IRS' 12 years
of ex?erience in this area should enable it to participate effectively in such a study.
[>''-

Treasury stated that it disagreed with our reu!f cc ,c};~t.ion
that it consider adopting formula apportionnv:::n t as a subs i tu te
for the arm's length standard.
However, we did not make such a
recom:nendation. What we recormnended was that, as part of its
study of section 482 enforcement procedures, Treasury should
consider all alternatives, of which form:.1L1 apportinn.r•;.c:nt. is
but one.
Treasury objected to the use of formula apportionment on
several grounds.
Treasury stated that formula apportionment has
little merit because a corporation could have an increas2d tax
burden as a result of its subsidia : s bee
ing more profitable.
Thus, according to Treasury, formul
apportionment does not attempt to achieve the statutory objec
ve of correctly reflecting
a taxpayer's income.
Treasury also asked whether formula apportionment should be used even when comparable uncontrolled prices
are available.
Treasury's response suggests to us that Treasury may have
thought we recommended the use of formula apport ionm<:;n t to mdke
income adjustments in all cases.
In contrast to the arm's length
standard, formula apportionment under the un i t.ary method vi e'.v'S
cotttrolled corporations which conduct integrated business operations as a single unit or business for tax purposes.
The formula
is used to apportion the income between taxing juris~ictions.
Since the formula sources the income of thE: controlled gr.·oup to
each taxing jurisdiction, arm's length price determincttion:; for
indi vidua 1 transact ions are not needed.
Ho<d ve r, i t is impoclanl
to keep in mind that formulas are applied only to unitary businesses.
If the controlled corporations are not considered to be
unitary in their business operations, then any transoctions that
need to be adjusted would be adjusted using the arm's length
standard.
Thus, if, after its study, Treasury were to decide
to use formula apportionment, i t would simply have an additional
enforcement tool available to complement the arm's length app
T rea. s u r y fur the r s t a t e c1 t h a_ t we mi n rrt I'>" cl t rv· iJ <1
n i !'; l r <:·
tive difficulties t.h~.t would rest1lt fron' tht.: uc:; of forntulc: ap
portionrnent.
As an exn.mple, Treasury cited the pr.:,ctical pro'r>lems involved in deciding whether or n6t a corporation should
be consic1erec1 unitary.
It was not our inteot to minimize the
adrninistrative difficult.ie,; nor to e
i z.; the ben fits of
fon,~11la apportionrn:.•rt!::..
It w;:~s ou inh:~nt, how vc:~r, t.o point.
out that the appr·oitch is characteci.ze,-1 ·both by b~:nr.··fi ts ;nt·l
difficultie::.; and to give exampleo> of e ch (s
PEJ· 50 t.o 52)·
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n/i ~:;-' ~~r3ir~s 'tlC P:-Jcc;untt:.red. ir1
eil··d f.;n 1la ·'Pi'')rtiot• -·nt_ ."\:3 on•:: a1t-c n._,tive -t1F'lt
t 1es·:cn .-,1!:-nini :.->t.r._lt ivc 1·urr1 n :1nd <JnccrL'li nty.
Thct-e i , hc·.;<:v··r,
ll<)
;:,piri(:al •;vj,1,,rwe :n; iL:1ble to prove or (Ji~;prove the f,-·;~s

ibility of impl•'!ll<'nting Lhe Ctpproach at the Fcderal level.
It
was our 1 nt.:nt th<'lt the Tn·:.~1sury stuc1y we recommen•Jr:od would rlev e 1 o p s u c h c rnp i r

j

c a 1 c v i c1 en c e •

Tn::zjsury also stated t_}1at formula apportionment is not
widely used by the States in a ~1lticorporate context.
Treasury .=ll so SCI id that }:;orne States which apply the formulas '>vor ldv.;irle are cnnsir1<'r inq ar).::u1<Joning them.
However, Treasury (_jave no
support for t1l•':Je staLelflcnts. Evidence available to us does not
'
.
.
.
support Treasury s contcnt1on. In response to a quest1onna1re
we sent to each of the 45 States with a corporate income tax,
2 6 Sta t~es replied that they use formula apportionmE•nt under the
unitary method in cases involving multicorporate entities (affiliated corporations) located within the United States while
11 States replied t.hat they apply formula apportionrnent worldwide.
None of the States responding to the questionnaire indicated an intent to abandon formula apportionment.
To our knowle~ge, the only change that a State is currently contenplating
to restrict rFlthcr than expand the use of formula apportionment
is in the form of legislation being considered in California.
That legislation would restrict the use of formula apportionment
only to the extent of excluding foreign parents of U.S. corporations in certain types of industries.

.

Both Treasury and IRS cited a 1979 report by the
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development in s
their reservations about the use of formula apportionment.
IRS suggested we state in our report that OECD has rejected
the use of formula apportionment because i t presents difficulties for taxpayers.
Treasury suggested we consider the OECD
criticism of formula apportionment as inconsistent with the provisions of current u.s. tax treaties.
We did consider the O~CD
report during our re
ew.
We chose not to discuss the OECD comments on formula apportionment because they were not supported
by empirical data to the same extent as other studies which we
did include.
The OECD statements that formula apportionment
presents difficulties for taxpayers were based on comments submitted by its J.l•?mber countries, and the O;<~CD report does not present Pmpirical r'lc-d-_a to support its conr:c1usions.
The OF:CD r~_~port
did, however, correctly ?Oint out that use of alternatives to the
a.nn' s length standard is incompatible with the OECD t'iodel Double
Taxa.tion Convention.
Again, we did not recommend that Treasury
should implement formula apportionment much less undertake any
such imple;-ncntat:ion unilaterally.
I f a Treasury study were to
s1lOW
hLOiJ<]h ,-,,,,picical r]at.i1 that fon;;u].l_ ,'1__(:'~''-)rt}o;w-ent did i_n-d00d have merit, T casury would still n cd to give considerable
t1•oc_Hjht to t:.he 1lest app1~oach of obtaining inten;ational
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fc)r c··n ~ ~ : :~- :' i~ 1-r)lf,rt>~~nt·>~~~ i r)n c_~f t.h
C'(JC,(',''l)i..
T\ 1 t t·r-t:
tives might inc·lc:"-c :~--:~ng a le:t,-lt:To_;hip n.Jlt· ztp)':opr·i_;r; ,, to ,: 1
world power such 2s t~~ U.S. and, in this le~dcr~hip role, ed
u c a t i n g o the r coL::-_:. :- -'_ :: ::: to the be n e f i t s o f f o r mu 1 a a p p o r t i 1 J n m, n t
or other technic:·_:,-,: _:::--z;icling for effective irnpler;>enLation.

Both IRS and ~~~~::~ry seemed to think that our statistics
presented a misle~~:~: and, in some cases, inaccurate oicture of
section 482 enfor.::: ::~:., a picture which ovcrstat_ed th~ di ffic u l t i e s in v o l v c :' . i·:" "::' e l i eve o u r s t a t -i s t i_ c s a c c u r a t ~--:: l y r e f 1 c c t
the data available
~s and convincingly show that the difficulties involve~ 1~ e~forcing section 482 are both real and
substantial.
IRS questior:e,~ -..---_::::ther we hacl included all relevant section
487. adjustments in o.:::- statistics.
Speci fic<-t lly, IRS th0119ht
we erroneously exclc~::~ $330 million
n adjustments from our sample.
We excluded the $330 million because these adjustments did
not involve a foreis~ subsidiary and,
hus, did not in a real sense
cross national hoc~~~=-ies.
We focused our review on aJjustcrl
transactions involvi~; foreign subsidiaries because we believe
that i t is in adju;:;:.~--<':!ts mac:Je to such trans.:1ctions that the real
workability and effe.:::.iveness of the arm's length stn_nc1ard must
be measured.
IR.S also note~: t'-:at our statistics did not include any cases
frortt the oil inclus:.:ry.
IRS assumed that this was because such
cases v1ere not clcs2.~ during the period covcrccJ by our scu.tpl e.
IRS was correct in t:-.is assur,tption.
Since thr> cL"lta cJvail<:tble to
us did not incluc1e c:-:s~.,s involving the oil inr1ustry, we C<'HtnoL
address IRS's stnte:-.2~t that such adjustments exce('d $600 mi lion
annlFllly.
IRS also thoL:sht we had understatecl the total nu;;11Jer of ac3just.mec:nts which wer:e based on a corctparable uncontrolled price.
IRS said we should h2ve taken into account that 240 of the 403
adjustments were attributable to situations whFCre the use of safe
haven pricing rules w2s mandatory.
Had we excluded these 240
transactions fror;, tha total of 403 adjusU~l<C~nts, we would have
reportecl that 7 perc~~t, not 3 percent, of IRS' section 4R7 ad
ju::;tt,,c:rtt.s w·::·re hc1se:: on compc;rab1r~ uncontro1lec1 prices.
v1e djcl
not excludt· thc~;c 2,~,1 ac1ju:-;Lrw:>nts h'1s0:1 on sz1f<' hit'JC!t1 rt!les b(•
Crtus
our purpose w::s to shn\,· how nHny of lh
totc1l st:cLion 4f17
adjusll'E·nts in our s:,:-:cplc vn~rc ba~;c'cl on c
rc~ble uncontrolled
price-:;.
Safe haven rricc;::; by definition are not cornrL::rr:tble uncontrolled pricr.::s.
R::tl;•·c, they art_~ price::; e~>tdh1ishc·cl r>y IR~;
an•1 r['rc.:,sury to be u:--:eJ in Sp(~cific si t.uationc;.
IRS hzu; recoy-nizr:-J th21t s fe h;_n·,•:: pric ~; ar-t:, not cot:lp<'crctbl c uth:<Jnl ro1 Lecl
pci C>':; ancl wi 11 p,,,-,,; t a ccJr·r,ncari on to uc-;r· 21 coup'tr<·'ll;:•
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L<S ;,<Jc'lf::d that its current data (1::xaminations cOLtpletc:d durny f
cal yc3r 1980) ~:;llG'd('d that 20 peccent of its J:.·ecor;:,;.•:l1d<:d
ecLion 482 '"dj,Jst
nts were based on ann's 1cn•jth prices ll:;ing
Lhe CC'.tpnc.•!Jle tmcontxolJ d Ltt.lhod. \'Ve did not 1:evicw the data
lHS cilc·d and thus do not know whether it is readily comparable
with our results.
Even so, using comparable uncontrolled prices
in only 20 I:-Jerce:nt of the adjustrr.ents is not, in our opinion, an
ndicotoc of :.:.ul.Jsidntial :.;;ucccss.

Trc<Jsut·y thuu,jht we concluded that the

[JJ:.c~;,.:nt

1:c'guJ,-itions

a !J' ~; C' r i o u s 1 y d c· f 0 c l i v e r; o 1 e 1 y be c a u s e the com p a r a b 1 e u nco n l r o 1 l < d
pdce method is only infn::tjuently used.
Tt-c•asury said we failed

to recognize t:hat uthc:r liiethods outlined in the reyulations are
on 1 y a 1 Lc r n a t i v P s for Lit r r i v i n g a t a n a nn ' s l eng t h p r i c e ii n d no t
d•·p,n:-tu.rcs from ihat principle. We did distinguish bctw(~en adjust nts ba~;ed on the identification of a comparable uncontrolled
prit.:e and adjustrltents based on an estimated price constructed by
an IHS c:xaminer using one of the alternative methods permitted
when a comp<:n.:.lble uncontrollc:d price cannot be easily identified
(sec pp. 28 to 29). We did so because we do not believe that an
estimated price is the same as a compacable uncontrolled price.
Moreover, our conclusion that section 482 enforcement under the
current tegulations is uncertain and administr-atively burdensome
is ot based solely on our statistical analysis of the sample.
Our review of the recent relevant literatur-e by experts in the
field of section 482 enforcement also led us to this conclusion,
a conclusion to which ouc statistical analysis lends supp6ct.
Treasury fucthec pointed out that we did not identify any
iDdications that u contcolled prices are ~ot used in
cases of intercompany pcicing which do not lead to an IRS adjustrnr:::nt. \"ie made no statement concerning such cases because this
ty~e of information is not available.
Neither Treasury noc IRS
JS cJevelo,tA:?d n1ethods to obtain the data needed to measure the
extent of noncompliance that exists within the universe of multinational co pocations.
IRS, however,
reed with our recommendation that it develop such data (seep. 26). Treasury's position
s ms to be that, if the transaction was not adjusted, it met
the rm's lenyth standard. We do not think this position is realistic ~hen analyzed in light of the information we wece able
to obtain.
Although the infocmation available to us provided
only an indication that increased potential for adjustment exists, we believe this possibility should not be ignoced.
IRS
examjnr·rs to}d us that only a few transactions can be examined
i!rl if t.
li:'.><:t.Jcns ;;reo not ;x."I''i:l<,d, pot,::ntial
dju~;lnl'"'·lt:s caniHJt be i,', 111 ificd. The:y lr;o stah.d that ;~()r.,e cxc:u;o:inecs give
s~ecific
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l'ric~t·ily t<.J C)L,nt.-:1-- .int r:-~-n,-:t j,~u:ll
trl
1 s.:111 ::) l)~
,~~
C)t1:tt
issues are less difficult and le..:ss tirn>:::-COlt:_,i_ll'tiLq.
Oul~ sLdti~;
tics can be interpreted to lend credence to the exazni ners' statements (see p. 41).
·t-,

Treasury further question,:od ou:r· conclusion thot di ffictdti.es
exist_ in applying the section 482 reg,1lati.on~:; by st·c:tinc_1 th,d_ our
statistica.l arwlysis we_s misleading or unpersuc>,~;ive.
Spocifi-cally, Treasury objected to our statistic that only 200 of the
519 corporations experienced adjustments because, according to
'1' r e z: ~ ~ 1 r y , the ::; c d a t a a r c s u b j e c t to v a rio u s i n t e r p r e to t ion s a n d
do not nec:essztrily reflect c1ifficu1ties with ano1y·jno the reoulat ton~:>.
Tredsury also quest toned our cor;lpC'trlson heL:.\"'Ct:r1 the
$277.5 million in section 482 adjustments and the $43.5 billion
total incorC~e of the exa:nineo firms.
Treasury statec1 that a sig-nificant portion of the income may be unrelated to transactions
between affiliates.
To be sure, the fact that only 200 of the
519 corporations experienced adjustments could he int,:rpretc<'l
differently, al.though Treasury did not make clear how tl1is might
be done.
We made our interpretation in the total context of information on section 482 enforcement available to us, including
examiners' statements that difficulti s in section 482 enforcement may cause some adjustments to be missed, and such statistics as could be developed.
We believe thot, taken in a total
context, the evidence suggests that a greater potential for
section 482 adjustments does indeed exist.
•
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Finally, IRS felt that we understated the frequency with
which comparable uncontrolled prices are used in nk't:ing tangible
property adjustments, the category of ac1justmenls where the largest amounts of revenue are involved.
IRS stated that its more
current data (examin.:.ttions COFlpleted during fiscal year 1980 and
6 months of fiscal yec:~r 1981) showed thdt 50 pct:ccnL of thescacljustmE'nts were made usin9 comparable unconlro11cc1 price:.~ (a~;
opposed to 15 percent in our dat.a base).
IRS aclc1cd that the
oth r· stuc1ies of section 48?. (seep. 33) \vhich shov:c<i thctt. only
21 to 28 perc~:nt of tangible property arljus\ntc:nts w~:re made
using cornrv:trahJ ~; uncontrolled prices did not support our con-clusion.
We did not review IRS' current data anc1 thus do not knov: if
i t is readily comparable with that in our s;o1nple.
Hov:C\!E~r, we do
believe the other studies of section 482 enforcel:,.c;n
support our
cooc-·lusion th;ct con.pc:trable uncontrolJerl prices are not fre<1ucntly
used in 1e1aking tangible prop.::rty adjusln;cnt~;.
'I'he other stu(hE.'s,
completed durin<J 1972, 1973, and 1980 showed th.::Jt ccwtp;:Jrarde uncontrolled prices l.vcre use:td in 2n, 21, and 24 pcrcenL of ta.nCJible
prC>flCrty adju:c;trn.c_•nts resrJectivcly.
'I'hc hi
cr p-.·r-c<:'llL.:lCJt?S shcJ;,;n
by the thrt:-•c studies and by IRS' currt:.•nt d;:tla n::ty 1:)c' clu,~: t.o the
fact that tho::e statiE~t.ic~; inclwlc· ac1ju:;Lrw·riLc; inv'~llving DJSC~;,
Western He:cli::;phc·r·c· Trade Coq•Ordtion~:; (\ /Ill\.. :~;), and U.S. p<J;;;-, ssion
1
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DEPARTMENT OF THE
WASHINGTON. D.C.

TREASUF~Y
20?~·J

As:>lSTANT St.cF-~i:.TARY

JU L 1 J 1381
Dear Mr. Anderson:
I ap:c>recictlE the opuortunity to present thc- Tred~·;ury
Departmc:nt's corr•mer.ts on the draft GAO report "Alloc liotl of
Income and Dedl!ction Within Multinatione.l Corporations -·A
Growing Proble:r, for IRS, Treasury and Corporate Taxpayers".
In general, the report contains useful information, but we
have substantial reservations about its conclusions with respect
to the problems associat.ed with intercompany pricing.
Our
specific corru:1ents are set forth below.

Our principal concern with the draft report is the recommendation that the Treasury consider the adoption of formula
apportionr-,ent as a substitute for the "arm's length"
principle in the current regulations.
This preference for
formula apportionment is not brtsed on any analysis of the
conceptually correct method for intercompany pricing, -w'h ich
should be the starting point for any review of the 482
regulations.
In terms of economic rationale, formula apportionment has little merit because a corporation could have an
increased tax burden merely as a result of its affiliates
becoming more profit.:1ble 0 r iiS '" rcs:.:l.t of paying higher wu.ges in
the jurisdiction applying the forn1U la.
It therefore do•.:·s not
attempt to achieve the statutory objective of correctly
reflecting a taxpayer's incom•:.
Form,!] :.1 apport ionrn<2nt is not, as the report indi c<>tes, wirl•c 1 y
used by the states in a multicorporate context.
Rather, it is,
with very few exceptions, used by the states only to divide the
income of a single multistate corporation, which is a totally
different matter.
The report~s case for formula apportionment rests entirely on
the vie'...r that it would be administratively conv"'rd.e:1t and reduce
taxpayer uncertainty.
Even on this basis, howr:ver, the report is
not convincing beca'JS<'e it minimizes the practico.l problems with
respect to formula apportionment.
The report docs noL dE>•r.on·st.r<ctE· ho•..; such methods woqld improve or sir:·:Jlify th•.c
i1lustrati.ve cases.
P.Jl t::Xdmple of an impoctdrtt practicdl probl~~"'
in applying formula apportionment in a multination ..~l situation is
the definition of a llnitary business.
In that regard, the report
is unrealistic in assur..ing that an advdnce ruling system for
determining the cc'r'\l'vsitior, of the unit;,ry grotrp wou1r1 b,•
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-2.;aministrat_ivc:ly Sliiiple.
1\iH)i:tler significant pr2ctic ..,1 prcb1•-·m
is ·the v2.luaLion of intar,<Jiblr:cs, -..,-h:ich v.;ould be L~.portant~ for
n;.~ny hi. gh t ,~,~hno] ogy mu 1 t i nat_iona ls.
It ·.vould al~_;o be useful for the report to review the
eXJ.:)Prience of jurisdictions that have used the unitary method.
Some of the few states wno use it, such as California, are
C:)nsidering abanz3oning it.
The expcr:i <:cnce of ~uropr;;:,n countries
c-ontributrcd to tJ1e very stron<:J OECD criticism of "global" Jin"':"P1ods
in ir_s 1979 x-"port on t ransfcr pricPs.
Hor<"over, fundula
;3pportiom<>0nt is not consisti?nt wit.h our prc•sent treaty poljcy.
Finally, the unitary method has been alleged to crr:ate an
unfavorable business climate for foreign corporations doing
business in a unitary state.

The report concludes that the present regulation is ser5ollsly
defective bece:use t_he comparable uncontrolled price method· is
only infrequently used in IRS adjustments.
We understand that
t.he IRS has made data available to you indicating that uncontrolled prices are used much more frequently than your data
indicates.
In any ce<~se, the report fails to adequately recognize
t'hat the ot_her methods outlined in the regulations are only
alternatives for arriving at an ann' s-length price, not departures from that principle.
Furthermore, there is no specific
indication that uncontrolled prices are not used in cases of
intercompany pricing Which do not lead to an IRS adjustment.
v:hatever the exact frequency with which uncontrolled pric.:s
are available, they are readily available in a number of cases.
In that regard, shouTdformula apportionment be used even when
uncontrolled prices are available?
lations
Much of the other dat_a presented to demonstrate proble:;-;s with
t_he current regulations are misleading or unpersuasive.
For
ex,:;mple, the report states that "only" 200 of the 519 multinat.ional corporations in the GAO saruple had Section 482
c.dj stm,'nts.
These data ?tre subject to various interpretations
aDd do not neces~;arily reflect difficulties 'with applying t:'le
current Section 482 regulations.
Furthermore, the report states
that Section 482 adjust_me:-lts amounted to "only" $277.5 million
cor:pared to the total income of the examined firms of $43.5
billion.
The use of total income as the standard for comparjson
has no logic?tl hasis bec?tuse, among other re?sons, a signific-nt
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-3portion of the inco1ne may be unrelat.ed to transaction::; bet..,·::•en
affiliate,~.
Finidly, the ma~1y ex<'!:i)le~; of Socti.on 4t':':l ca::;,_·~>
discussed in the report are infot·rnative, but they do not
necessarily relate to the report's major conclusions and the
recommendations to the Secretary of the Treasury.
Safe Haven Interest Rate
•rne report recorrunends that "the treasury adjust the safe
haven rate as frequently as necessary to realistically reflect
the current costs of borrowing." As you are aware, a change in
safe haven interest rate has been implemented effective July 1.
The Treasury has explored the use of self-·adjusting rate but has
found that it would lead to many practical prohle::,;s for taxpayers.
However, we anticipate that. the s<1fe haven interest rate
will be adjusted periodically in the future to reflect major
changes in interest costs.
Future Work
These corrunents are not intended to suggest that there are no
problems with the application of the current Section 482
regulations.
\'ie realize that the arm's-length principle may have
both conceptual and practical limitations in a world of integrated firms selling differentiated products.
The Treasury has
examined and will continue to examine specific problems in the
regulations, and will propose changes if they appear useful or
warranted.
We will also work with the IRS on issues raised by
the recently cot~leted survey on 482 adjustments. However,
additionctl analysis is necessary before we can conc-lude that a
mrJ. jor rev ie\-1 of the regulations is warranted.
My staff wi 11 be happy to expand on our conm1ents.
Sincerely,

John~a~

Assistant Secretar.f
(Tax Policy)
Mr. William J. Anderson
Director
General Gove rrw~'"n t Divis ion
U.S. General Accounting Office
W~shiD0tOn, D.C.
20548
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